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Abstract
Generic drug approval cases involving Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations are adjudicated at the Federal Court through the judicial review
process. The European Union alleges that this abbreviated process is unfair to litigants
who hold patents on medicines, since it does not encompass all of the features of a trial,
nor is it an actual suit for patent infringement. In addition, the process has unequal
appeal rights for the patent holder and the patent challenger, where the generic challenger
can appeal a decision at Federal Court, but the patent holder cannot.
When examining the pattern of decision making in Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations cases at the Supreme Court of Canada, there is little evidence to
suggest that the Supreme Court Justices are making wrong or unfair decisions because
the lower court cases were decided through the judicial review process. The decision
making pattern is very similar to the pattern in the Supreme Court patent cases, and to
Supreme Court jurisprudence overall, so there is little reason to think that wrong
decisions on these cases are being made because of the abbreviated process. In addition,
the pattern of decision making in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is
much different than the Supreme Court jurisprudence on copyright, an area of law that
has been through a period of significant change due to issues surrounding digital music.
The copyright cases are quite comparable to the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases, in that the original adjudication of both case types was through the
process of judicial review. However, the decision making pattern in the copyright cases
contrasts the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, in that there
are few concurring opinions in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and
a high proportion of concurring opinions in the copyright cases, which indicates that the

interpretation of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is not
creating divided opinions amongst the Justices, nor is the abbreviated process of judicial
review from the lower court contributing to significant judicial disagreement. This study
therefore provides evidence that a full trial for patent infringement in these cases would
not necessarily change the outcomes in these cases.
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Chapter One: An Overview of the Study
Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations1 were
implemented in 1993 to balance two objectives: protect patents to induce brand name
pharmaceutical companies to invest in research and development in Canada, and to
expedite the approval of generic copies of drugs that had lost patent protection. Patent
terms had to be protected by preventing the launch of generic copies of brand name drugs
before their patents expired. In some instances a generic company would simply infringe
on the patent holder’s rights, since the penalties incurred from infringement were
significantly smaller than the profits. At the same time, the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations were supposed to expedite the approval process for generic
medications by preventing unnecessary delays brought about by clever patenting
strategies by the patent holder.2 Expediting the approval of generics is an important
measure in containing health care costs. As generics are significantly less expensive than
their brand name counterparts, it is prudent to have them available as soon as the patents
on the innovative product have expired.
Before the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations came into
existence, generic manufacturers seeking approval to manufacture and sell copies of
brand name drugs in Canada were required to undergo the same extensive safety and
efficacy testing as brand name pharmaceuticals. In accord with new commitments under

SOR/93-133 [PM(NOC), or PM(NOC) Regulations, or “the Regulations”].
This could include adding patents that were not necessarily related to the drug product in question, or
evergreening patents to extend patent life. Evergreening is the process of adding successive patents onto an
existing patent to block the copying of a medicine when the initial patents expire. This was addressed in
the amendments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in 2006, S 5(4)(a) and (b),
which freeze the patent register for a novel drug once marketing approval of that drug is granted.
1
2

2

the North American Free Trade Agreement3 and the World Trade Organization’s
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,4 Canada simplified
its procedures for approving generics, allowing generic manufacturers to rely on the
research and clinical and safety studies submitted for approval of the corresponding
branded pharmaceuticals.
Over the course of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations’
twenty-one year life span (1993 to 2016), several issues have arisen over their fairness to
the litigants in a proceedings related to the approval process of a new generic drug. For
one, litigation arising from the generic drug approval process operates by way of a
summary process called judicial review, which is used to review the applicability of
certain patents that may be holding up the genericization of a particular branded
medicine. Eliminating or curtailing some elements of a full trial, the judicial review
process concerns Canada’s trading partners, because judges are making decisions about
the approval of generic drugs on abbreviated information about the patents behind the
innovative pharmaceutical, and are also deferring a great deal of expertise to Health
Canada, who can decide to allow generic companies to bypass certain patents. Although
Canada argued at a World Trade Organization complaint hearing that the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations simply provide additional protection over
and above the protection afforded in the Patent Act, the entire process has been viewed
3

North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, T.S. No. 2 (1994), 32.
I.L.M. 289 (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States; entered into force
Jan. 1, 1994), [NAFTA].
4
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Apr 15, 1994, Oct. 30, 1947, T.S. No. 27 (1947),
58 U.N.T.S. 187, (negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of the World Trade
Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]). Canada signed the TRIPS Agreement
in 1994, and it was in force at the beginning of 1995. TRIPS is administered by the World Trade
Organization. It establishes standards for the protection of intellectual property for World Trade
Organization members.
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by the European Union and its member states as an opportunity for the generic
manufacturer to overturn patents and accelerate development times, simply because the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations operate under a legal backdrop
that does not encompass a complete dispute mechanism that adjudicates the validity of
the patents themselves.5
The judicial review process that emanates from the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations has also been criticized6 for having unbalanced appeal rights,
where the innovator is without an appeal at the moment a judge rules in favor of the
generic manufacturer, since generic approval is granted immediately following an
unsuccessful challenge by the patent holder to stop that approval.7 Regulations within
North American Free Trade Agreement, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Agreement, and the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade
Agreement8 require that signatory countries provide brand and generic pharmaceutical
companies equal appeal rights after a trial court decision, but the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations do not allow for effective appeals, since a generic

World Trade Organization, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, A Complaint by the
European Communities and their Member States, Report of the Panel, March 17, 2000, WT/DS114/R.
This complaint will be discussed in detail later in Chapter Four, on page 56.
6
Suzanne Porter, “Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: Removing
Inefficiencies to Encourage Generic Competition” (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto Faculty of Law,
2011). Suzanne Porter is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Toronto. Her master’s thesis
compared Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations to the United States’ HatchWaxman Act, and concluded that the Canadian regulations could be made fair if the Regulations were
amended to include a direct patent infringement suit when evaluating any patents under the generic
medicines approval process, where the process would provide both litigants with equal appeal rights.
7
Supra note 1, S. 7(2)(b). If the court declares that the patents are not valid, or that the patents will not be
infringed, there is no longer a reason to hold up the approval of a generic drug, and the Notice of
Compliance is issued, in accordance with S. 7(1)(e).
8
The text of the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) was
finalized on September 26, 2014 and is currently awaiting ratification. The finalized text can be found at
www.international.gc.ca/CETA. The provision for equal appeal rights is found in S 9 bis of CETA, Article
1709 of NAFTA, and Article 27 of TRIPS. Appeal rights are discussed in Chapter Four page 63.
5
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company must be granted approval for its product if an initial challenge by a brand
manufacturer is dismissed.
The legal burden of proof in judicial reviews over generic approval has been
criticized as being unfair,9 since it falls on the innovator company to defend its patents,
even though it has already established patent protection for its pharmaceutical under the
Patent Act.10 Since the generic applicant can allege that the patents are invalid or
inapplicable to the drug product in question, the patent holder becomes responsible for
defending its previously issued patents, and if it does not do so, the Minister of Health
will order a Notice of Compliance to approve the generic drug for manufacture and sale
in Canada.11
The standard of review in these judicial review proceedings is the reasonableness
of the Minister of Health in deciding to list or de-list a patent on the Patent Register, and
not a determination of the correct patent status for the patents involved. For decisions
made by government tribunals that are judicially reviewed, the question for the judge
therefore becomes whether or not that government minister acted reasonably, and not
whether he acted correctly. The standard of review of reasonableness goes hand in hand
with the mechanism of judicial review to expedite decision making in these cases, where
technical or scientific expertise is involved. With significant deference given to Health
Canada’s expertise in pharmaceuticals, there is concern amongst members of the

9

Supra note 6.
Frederick Rein and Patrick Smith. “A Discussion of Generic Drug Approval and Patent Systems in the
United States and Canada.” (2009) 25 CIPR 83 at 92.
11
Supra note 1, S. 7(2)(b).
10

5

European Union that the rights afforded to patent holders do not encompass the full
protection guaranteed to them under the Patent Act.12
In an attempt to reduce potential uncertainty vis-à-vis judicial review, specific
adjustments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could make
them similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act13 in the United States, which employs a full
action for infringement, complete with discovery, the adjudication of patent validity to a
standard of correctness, and the opportunity to appeal14 that automatically comes into
play in the generic medicine approval process. When a generic manufacturer alleges that
a patent on a drug is invalid or not applicable, that generic manufacturer is automatically
deemed to have infringed on the patent, establishing a cause of action under the United
States Patents Act.15 Whether or not replacing the judicial review process with an action
for infringement is correct depends on the nature of the issues associated with the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, and whether the Supreme Court
Justices are having significant disagreement16 because of the abbreviated nature of the
judicial review process in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases that have
been granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. This paper will demonstrate that
there is insufficient evidence that the process of judicial review is creating increased
disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices; without a high level of disagreement

12

Porter, supra note 6 at 42.
The Hatch-Waxman Act is also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.
Its abbreviated name is from its sponsors, Republican senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Congressman
Henry Waxman. The Act is incorporated into The Federal Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act, 21 USC
§355(j).
14
Supra note 6 at 43.
15
35 USC (2006).
16
A case where there is significant disagreement among the Justices may be decided differently in the
presence of additional evidence, which would be the case if the cases were decided by way of an action
rather than judicial review. This situation will be referred to as “difficulty” in various places throughout
this thesis.
13

6

amongst the Justices, there is little evidence to support claims that these cases cannot be
adjudicated properly through the judicial review process. This will therefore guide future
research on how the Regulations should be amended, if at all.
By building a profile of the types of decisions made in the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme Court and comparing that profile to other
decision making patterns available from other studies, conclusions can be drawn as to
whether there is evidence of significant disagreement and improper decision making.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine if judicial review is really problematic
in these cases, and it will help to determine if adjustments to the Regulations are
necessary for respecting Canada’s agreements in international trade.17
The Central Investigations of the Thesis
First, the decision making pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Supreme Court cases will be compared to the general patent cases at the
Supreme Court of Canada. A similar pattern suggests that Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases are decided correctly, and that the Justices had no more difficulty in
reaching a decision in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than in the
patent cases generally. This qualitative comparison will be combined with a qualitative
examination of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme
Court to see which cases have significant patent adjudication issues. This qualitative
comparison will also offer insight as to whether the cases are primarily about patent

17

A study of the decision making patterns in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the
Federal Court could also be undertaken, but there are over one thousand cases to be researched. In
addition, there are no decision making studies at the Federal Court level that can be used for comparison.
The Supreme Court cases allow each litigant one hour to present an argument. The arguments are based on
the evidence, law, and adjudication made at the Federal Court of Appeal, so the decisions at the Supreme
Court are related to what has been presented at the lower court. See Future Research in Chapter Seven, p
114.

7

infringement, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, or the judicial
review process itself.
The second task will be to determine whether or not the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Supreme Court cases have a decision making profile that is
similar to the Supreme Court copyright cases analyzed in Professor Margaret Ann
Wilkinson’s pentalogy article, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in
The Copyright Pentalogy.18 If there is the same proportion of unanimous decisions,
majority decisions with concurring reasons, and solo dissents in patent infringement and
invalidity cases as in the Supreme Court of Canada copyright decisions, then there is
some evidence that the administrative component, the process of judicial review, is itself
problematic, and further academic investigation into this process would be warranted.
The third research task will be to determine whether the Supreme Court decisions
on the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases fit into the general pattern of
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which covers all disciplines of law. The study
data will be compared to the pattern of unanimous, majority decisions with concurring
reasons, dissent, and solo dissents in Supreme Court jurisprudence studies. This question
is extends from the data collection required to investigate the comparison to copyright,
since Wilkinson’s article compared the copyright cases to the Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court data provides an additional pattern of decision
making that can be compared the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in The Copyright
Pentalogy, How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Copyright Law, ed. Michael Geist
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) 71-92. Wilkinson is jointly appointed to the Faculty of Law
and the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at the University of Western Ontario. She holds a law
degree from the University of Toronto, a Bachelor of Arts degree (University of Toronto), a masters of
legal studies (University of Toronto), and a Doctor of Philosophy degree (University of Western Ontario).
18

8

If the decision making patterns are similar to the Supreme Court patent cases or
the general Supreme Court cases, it suggests that the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases are adjudicated in a similar fashion to full actions, indicating that the
process of judicial review is not causing more disagreement among the Justices than in
any other cases. If there is no more disagreement among the Justices in the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than the general Supreme Court cases or the
Supreme Court patent cases, then research on the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations should focus on aspects other than the judicial review process.
The results provide relevant information about the effect of the abbreviated process of
judicial review to the specific complaint brought forward by the European Union about
Canada’s obligations under TRIPS.
A Hypothesis: Judicial Review is “Enough” Process
The Comparison of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases
to the Supreme Court Patent Cases and the General Supreme Court Cases
Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law provides a framework for understanding
why judicial review provides enough process for adjudicating disputes arising from the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. Ronald Dworkin was the
pioneer of the “right answer” theory of the law,19 asserting that the role of judges is to use
their extraordinary abilities to understand the law, then apply it to a fact situation to
determine the “right” answer in a case. Dworkin believes that there is a single right
answer to every case.

19

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

9

Dworkin does not believe that the law can be accurately encompassed in a theory
that just describes the law as a scientific principle to which people adhere to by nature.
Descriptive or “natural” models of the law describe an objective morality of the law,
which is not created by human beings, but is discovered by them, as one could discover a
law of physics: “Moral reasoning or philosophy is a process of reconstructing the
fundamental principles by assembling concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural
historian reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones that
he has found.”20 Dworkin’s theory, however, is constructive, in that it “treats institutions
of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but rather as stipulated
features of a general theory to be constructed, as if the sculptor set himself to carve the
animal that best fits a pile of bones he happened to find together.”21 In other words, the
judge, as an architect, takes existing judgments and legislation, and assembles them in the
right order to administer the law.
This ‘constructive’ model does not assume, as the natural model does, that
principles of justice have some fixed, objective existence, so that descriptions of
these principles must be true or false in some standard way. It does not assume
that the animal it matches to the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and
in some ways more complex, assumption that men and women have a
responsibility to fit the particular judgments on which they act into a coherent
program or action, or, at least, that officials who exercise power over other men
have that sort of responsibility.22
Dworkin reinforces his constructive model by stating that it is somewhat creative,
but clarifies that it does not require inventing justice, but involves interpretation:
The justification need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice, but it
must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting that
practice, not inventing a new one.23
Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position” (1973) U Chi L Rev 40, 500.
Supra note 19 at 160.
22
Supra note 19 at 160.
23
Ronald Dworkin, “Law’s Empire” (1986) Harvard UP, 66.
20
21
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In other words, law requires “constructive interpretation,” where law is not a natural
concept (that would emanate from a supreme being, for example, and be “natural” to
follow), but requires “imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the
best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”24 Imparting
constructive interpretation means that Dworkin’s model is therefore argumentative in
nature: “constructive interpretations… try to show legal practice as a whole in its best
light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best
justification of that practice.”25
Dworkin delineates three stages of constructive interpretation:
First, there must be a “preinterpretive” stage in which the rules and standards
taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are identified…. Second,
there must be an interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general
justification for the main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive
stage…. Finally, there must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which he
adjusts his sense of what the practice “really” requires so as better to serve the
justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.26
The three stages serve to form the basis of interpretation. A judge would gather the
relevant cases and legislation required, then interpret the facts with respect to the cases
and legislation, then reflect upon that decision and how it fits into the existing
jurisprudence.
Dworkin also asserts that the interpretive attitude required in law requires value
judgments. He affirmed that
…propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal history, in a
straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced from

24

Ibid at 52.
Supra note 23 at 55.
26
Supra note 23 at 65.
25
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legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of
both description and evaluation but is different from both.27
Using the rules of courtesy as an example, Dworkin explains that the interpretive attitude
requires an assumption that it has an objective value (or a purpose) and a further
assumption that the interpretive attitude is sensitive to that value.
The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but
has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle – in
short, that it has some point – that can be stated independently of just describing
the rules that make up the practice. The second is the further assumption that the
requirements of courtesy – the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants – are
not necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are
instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied
or extended or modified or qualified or limited by that point. Once this
interpretive attitude takes hold, the institution of courtesy ceases to be
mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a runic order. People now try
to impose meaning on the institution – to see its best light – and then to
restructure it in the light of that meaning.28
It is clear that Dworkin is endorsing a moral reading of the practice of law - law and
morality are part of the same system. He argues that the concept of values is integrated
into law, stating that “[i]t would make little sense to treat the political values… as
detached values.”29 He extends this integration of law and morality by avowing that a
theory of the law
Must find the place of each value in a larger and mutually supporting web of
conviction that displays supporting connections among moral and political values
generally and then places these in the still larger context of ethics.30
This does not mean that all judges will come to the same answer, as that would imply that
there is a consensus as to what is ‘right.’ Rather, there is a right answer for a particular

Ronald Dworkin, “How Law is Like Literature” in A Matter of Principle (1985) Harvard UP at 147.
Supra note 23 at 47.
29
Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Point of Political Philosophy” in Justice in Robes (2006)
Harvard UP, at 158.
30
Ibid at 168.
27
28
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judge who applies his own principles correctly to the legal question at hand. A particular
case may be difficult to judge, but it is the analysis of the judge, based on his upbringing,
character, and education, that allows him to properly interpret the law, making his answer
right, regardless of which side of the law the decision falls.
Considering Dworkin’s one right answer thesis, framed within his principles of
constructive interpretation of the law, integration of values into the law, and evaluation of
legal history, a judge can solve a hard case by interpreting and applying existing law, and
evaluating that outcome within the frame of reference of the law and his own sense of
morality, which is infused into the law. By applying this formula, there is no new law
created, but rather an application of existing law, with a legal and moral argument
underpinning it, and one right answer is the result. To test his theory against difficult
legal cases (where deciding the case in favour of one litigant over another is not easy),
Dworkin created imaginary Judge Hercules:
[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call
Hercules… a judge in some representative American jurisdiction… [who] accepts
the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his
jurisdiction… that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish
legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of
their court or higher courts whose rationale… extends to the case at bar.31
This is consistent with Dworkin’s position in Justice for Hedgehogs, where he explains
how judges reach a decision in difficult cases by distinguishing between indeterminacy
and uncertainty:
But in all these aspects indeterminacy differs from uncertainty. “I am uncertain
whether the proposition in question is true or false” is plainly consistent with “It is
one or the other,” but “The proposition is neither true nor false” is not.32

31
32

Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1974) 88 Harvard L Rev at 1083.
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Harvard UP, at 91.
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Hercules allows Dworkin to separate indeterminacy from uncertainty, since it would be
implausible for a judge to come to a conclusion on an indeterminate legal question, but
realistic to think that there is one right answer to an uncertain legal question that can be
constructed and interpreted from pre-existing legal materials in difficult cases, evaluated
from both the underlying legal and moral principles then be integrated into the law.
Therefore Judge Hercules, reading factums, and affidavits of witnesses being
examined and cross-examined in a generic medicine approval case, should be able to
weave the law of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations into a case
to reach the right decision, even if the process is not as thorough as an action, simply
because his background and principles will lead him to the right answer. To state that
more process is required means that a judge can do a better job if he just has more
information, and diminishes the idea that the judge can make the right decision, based on
his abilities and the information that he does have. If the process of judicial review is
insufficient for adjudicating the cases, the process could be leading to uncertainty or
indeterminacy, but the addition of a partial process, like judicial review, should not create
indeterminacy, but only serve to remove it. If there is indeterminacy in the case, it is
unclear how additional process would ever change that. Therefore, issues with
indeterminacy should not be prevalent with Judge Hercules in Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases, but uncertainty could. If Judge Hercules is left with some
uncertainty in these cases, Judge Hercules can still make a decision, because of his
background and his skill at applying the law and his values to the problem. If there is a
lot of uncertainty in these cases because of the process, and Judge Hercules is not always
achieving the one right answer, this will be borne out by a different pattern of decision
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making in the Supreme Court Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases than in
the Supreme Court patent cases or the Supreme Court general jurisprudence. I am
confident that the judicial review process provides enough process for the achievement of
the one right answer by the Herculean effort of the Supreme Court Justices.
Dworkin’s critics33 state that the legal principles held by Judge Hercules may be
insufficient to solve difficult cases, which could leave him in a dilemma. In technical
cases involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, the question
emerges as to whether the additional process involved in a full action, as opposed to a
judicial review, would make it any easier for a judge to reach the right decision, or leave
him in a dilemma. An analysis of the decision making pattern, and a comparison to the
pattern of judgments in the Supreme Court patent group or the general Supreme Court
group will help in this determination, where similar patterns would refute this idea, since
difficult cases naturally to lead to more judicial disagreement.34 A pattern of decision
making that is not problematic would be similar to a pattern of decisions in similar cases
that were adjudicated through a complete action, especially if the cases are somewhat
related. If the pattern of decision making in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases is no different than the Supreme Court patent cases, or the general
Supreme Court cases, and judges will be applying their principles to come up with the

Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin, (1992), Stanford UP, 137-147. At 145, Guest states that “Dworkin’s
thesis is… a defensive thesis to the criticism that there cannot be right answers in hard cases where there is
no ‘proof’ or demonstration.”
34
Disagreement among Justices at the Supreme Court of Canada is discussed by Peter McCormick in
Chapter Five: Peter McCormick, “Standing Apart: Separate Concurrence at the Modern Supreme Court of
Canada 1984 to 2006” (2008) 53 McGill LJ 137. Professor Wilkinson also discusses concurring decisions
and disagreement at the Supreme Court, which will be discussed in Chapter Five: Margaret Ann
Wilkinson, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” in The Copyright Pentalogy, How the
Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Copyright Law, ed. Michael Geist (Ottawa: University
of Ottawa Press, 2013) 71-92.
33
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right answer in any particular case, it lends credence to the idea that the abbreviated
process at the Federal Court is not creating more disagreement among Justices at the
Supreme Court. Innovative pharmaceutical firms are motivated for more process, since
more process would lead to actual patent infringement actions, live witness testimony,
and more time where the innovator’s product is in a monopoly position in the
marketplace.
Dworkin’s one right answer hypothesis is not intended to be a holistic theory
about the law of pharmaceuticals, generic approval, or judicial review. Rather, its
constructivist features fit with the assertion that a full patent infringement trial equalizes
fairness to patent holders in generic drug approval litigation. Although a full trial may
provide a judge with a few more “bones” to construct, my assertion is that the judicial
review process provides enough evidence in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases to make any difference between the two processes.
A Hypothesis about the Comparison of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Cases to the Copyright Cases
If the pattern of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is dissimilar
to that of the copyright cases, the analysis does not support the idea that it is the
abbreviated process of judicial review itself that is problematic in deciding these cases.
The pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is not likely to be
similar to the copyright cases, seeing that the copyright cases over the past two decades
have involved digital rights over music, while the Copyright Modernization Act was not
passed until 2012.35 There is likely much more dissent and concurring opinions in the

35

SC 2012, c20.

16

copyright cases than the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. A pattern of
cases that is, instead, similar to the pattern in general Supreme Court jurisprudence
supports the notion that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are no
more difficult to decide than other Supreme Court cases.
Decision Making Patterns as Relative Comparisons
The present study uses data from previous decision making patterns to draw
relative comparisons among the groups of cases. But previous studies have focused on
discovering the underlying motivations and beliefs of judges that could be affecting one
particular group of decisions. Early studies of decision making attempted to link the
political ideology and attitudes of judges to their judicial outcomes, but the relative
comparison in this study alleviates the need to try to postulate about these “hidden”
factors.
The political justifications for judicial attitudes in these previous studies do not
necessarily align with Dworkin’s one right answer theory. In accord with Dworkin’s
theory, a judge, because of his background and his knowledge of the law, should not
allow political beliefs to sway interpretations of the law.
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Chapter Two: Methodology for Answering the Central Questions
Data Collection
The first step in examining the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases
will be to collate all of the patent cases and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases at the Supreme Court since 1970. This time period was chosen, since previous
decision studies on the Supreme Court reach back to the early seventies. Thirty-one
patent cases were heard at the Supreme Court during this period, providing an adequate
number cases for comparison, across several different panels of Justices. Since the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations received Royal Assent in 1993,
there have only been six cases that have reached the Supreme Court (Table One). All six
are included in the study.
Table 1: The Six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases
Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)36
Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (Attorney General)37
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health)38
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc.39
Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc.40
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc.41

36

[1998] 2 SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-Frosst].
[2005] 1 SCR 533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-Myers].
38
[2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 [Astra-Zeneca].
39
[2008] 3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-Synthelabo].
40
[2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60 [Teva].
41
[2015] SCC 20 [Sanofi-Aventis].
37
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The composition of the court (the number of Supreme Court Justices) will be
recorded, as well as the central issues in each case. The different categories of decisions
for the cases will be tabulated: the number of unanimous decisions, the number of
majority decisions with and without minority concurring reasons and with and without
dissent. Dissents will be categorized and tabulated as unanimous,42 non-unanimous
(multiple dissents),43 and solo.44 The number of each type of judgment will also be
counted, and the total number of reasons given out over all of the cases will be tabulated
for comparative purposes. Case disposition data, defined as the percentage of allowed
appeals for a given category of cases, will also be tabulated. The tabulation of data
comprises the decision making pattern.
Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright case data on decision making from the
Pentalogy study will be referenced in similar format to the patent data. Wilkinson’s data
on general Supreme Court decision making patterns, referenced from other authors, will
also be used, and supplemented with statistical information from the Supreme Court of
Canada official website.
Analysis of the Central Question
Once the decisions have been tabulated and the issues have been recorded for the
patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, a comparative analysis will
be performed. To answer the first question, the decision making patterns in the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations cases will be compared to the Supreme

42

Unanimous dissent refers to a dissent agreed upon by more than one justice, where only one set of
dissenting reasons is provided.
43
Non-unanimous dissent would involve two or more dissents in a case, and could include multiple
signatories on each, or two solo dissents, or a dissent with more than one signatory and a solo dissent.
44
Solo dissents are dissents written by one justice, with no other judges in agreement with the dissent.
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Court patent cases. Although decisions in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases may invalidate patents (as in a traditional infringement or impeachment action),
patenting and generic drug approval become linked, since the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations invoke challenges to the validity of patents for the purpose
of getting generic pharmaceuticals approved for sale in the Canadian market. If the
comparison distinguishes the two types of cases, it suggests that the different pattern
reflects different issues in the cases, or differences related to the way the two sets of cases
are adjudicated.
Second, the decision making patterns in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases will be compared to the decision making patterns in Professor
Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright study. A similar pattern could indicate that judges
have similar levels of disagreement with both types of cases, suggesting that the
predominant issue with the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is more
administrative than legislative in nature. As discussed, the administrative issues at play
would primarily be related to the elements of judicial review and not the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations themselves. Conversely, differences in
the decision making patterns of the two sets of cases would not provide evidence of any
common problem involving the process of judicial review in the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases or the copyright cases.
Third, a comparison of decision making patterns will be made with Supreme
Court cases generally to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. Differing
patterns could highlight the level of consensus among Supreme Court Justices when
deciding the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. A low level of consensus
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would provide evidence that the judicial review process is insufficient for deciding the
cases. A high level of consensus suggests that the judicial review process is sufficient.
In summary, a comparison of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada to Wilkinson’s copyright case data, Supreme
Court patent case data, and general Supreme Court decision making data will help
characterize the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) decisions and point the way
for future research. The data from this analysis will help to support or reject the idea that
the process of judicial review leads to less agreement and potentially more wrong
outcomes when decisions over the approval of generic medicines are made. Not only
will each comparison provide information, but the three comparisons together will also
help to create an overall picture as to whether or not the use of judicial review in these
cases is increasing the level of disagreement and potentially incorrect outcomes.
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Chapter Three: Pharmaceutical Companies, the Drug Approval Process and Patenting in
Canada
This chapter will introduce fundamental concepts about generic and innovative
pharmaceuticals and the pharmaceutical approval process in Canada. An overview of
patenting will be provided to draw attention to how the elements of patent apply to
medicines. Patent infringement and impeachment, and any ensuing litigation in Canada,
as it applies to any patent, will also be outlined, as this process is available to holders of
patents on pharmaceuticals. In addition, understanding the generic drug approval process
requires an explanation of the history of compulsory licencing in Canada, and how
Canada’s international trade obligations led to the elimination of this practice and the
introduction of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.
Generic versus Brand (Innovative) Pharmaceuticals
Brand name pharmaceuticals, or innovative pharmaceuticals, are medicines that
result from primary research and development. Research for creating new medicines is
challenging, time-consuming, and expensive. Developing a new prescription medicine
that gains market approval costs, on average, $802 million and takes over ten years to
complete.45 Of these costs, fifty percent is attributed to synthesizing novel molecules
through complicated chemical processes.46 Compounds that exhibit theoretical promise
are investigated for safety, followed by efficacy, which means that they must be both safe
for consumption and useful in treating specific medical conditions. Safety and efficacy

Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen, and Henry Grabowski, “The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of
Drug Development Costs,” (Oct 2002) J Health Econ, at 180. This figure is provided in year 2000 dollars,
and represents the out-of-pocket costs for development. The authors also provide an updated figure of
$1,395 million, as of 2014, on the Tufts University Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study.
46
The research often employs complex computer algorithms that can generate hundreds of thousands of
compounds which are then screened. Promising compounds are developed through the synthesis outlined
in the algorithm.
45
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testing, filing for patents, and managing regulatory requirements accounts for the
remaining fifty percent of the costs, but recent studies have shown that both the time and
the costs involved in doing clinical trials has increased dramatically in the past ten years
due to more complex regulatory requirements. Requirements for more study subjects,
requirements for longer studies for drugs used for chronic conditions, and difficulty
recruiting study subjects are among the reasons for the increased time and costs
associated with clinical trials.47
Generic pharmaceuticals are “copies” of brand name pharmaceuticals, which are
bioequivalent to the branded product. Bioequivalence means that the concentration of the
drug in the bloodstream of the generic drug is the same as in the branded (or reference)
product. Bioequivalence also requires that the maximum concentration of the generic
drug in the bloodstream is the same as the maximum concentration in the branded
product. For the purposes of bioequivalence, Health Canada defines bioequivalence as:
a. The 90% confidence interval of the relative mean area under the concentration
versus time curve to the time of the last quantifiable concentration (AUCT) of the
test to reference product should be within 80.0% to 125.0% inclusive.
b. b) The relative mean maximum concentration (Cmax) of the test to reference
product should be between 80.0% and 125.0% inclusive.48
Generally, part a. means that a generic drug is considered “the same” or “equivalent” if
the concentration of drug in the bloodstream falls between 80 percent and 125 percent of
the branded product 90 percent of the time. Part b. indicates that the maximum

Dickson, Michael and Gagnon, Jean Paul, “Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and
Development” (May, 2004) 3(5): Nature Reviews. Drug Discovery, 417 at 418.
48
Health Canada Drugs and Health Products Guidance Document – Comparative Bioavailability Standards:
Formulations Used for Systemic Effects. (May 2012), File No. 12-105972-31. The preamble states that
“The purpose of these documents is to update and consolidate eleven existing Health Canada documents
related to the conduct and analysis of comparative bioavailability studies and the standards to be met in
those studies in order to comply with Sections C.08.002(2)(h), C.08.002.1(2)(c)(ii) and C.08.003(3) of the
Food and Drug Regulations.”
47
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concentration in the bloodstream should be within 80 percent to 125 percent of the
branded product.
These copied medicines are synthesized using the information disclosed in the
patents registered on brand name pharmaceuticals. Significantly less research and
development is required to copy a drug than to bring a new innovative drug to market.
Consequently, generic pharmaceuticals cost a fraction of what brand name
pharmaceuticals cost to develop. It is estimated that the development of a generic drug in
Canada takes three to six years and costs $4 million to bring the drug to market.49
Generic pharmaceuticals create savings for provincial governments, which pay or
subsidize the cost of medications for many of their residents, including senior citizens,
the disabled, and welfare recipients, so there is a strong motivation to genericize drugs
once the drug’s patents have expired.50 In Canada, generic drug prices range from 56
percent to 31 percent of the brand drug price.51 Generic companies have to wait for
patents on innovative pharmaceuticals to expire, or they have to demonstrate that the
existing patents on the innovative pharmaceuticals are invalid or irrelevant.
In 2013, there were $13.6 billion in sales of patented medicines, and $8.4 billion
in sales of non-patented (mainly generic) medicines in Canada. Since 2011, research and

Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, “Generic Prescription Drug Development” (July 2015) at
p 10, online: http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/resources/docs/DDBookletWebEng.pdf
50
See, for example, the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary, which is a comprehensive list of drugs, or
formulary, paid for by the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care in the Province of Ontario. The
Ministry’s formulary can be found online on their website at
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/drugs/odbf_eformulary.aspx. By searching “pantoprazole,”
one can see the example of brand name Pantoloc 40mg. The drug has a listed price of $2.0803 per tablet,
but the Ministry only covers up to $0.3628 per tablet, which is the price of the generic “copies” listed on
the site. See “pms-pantoprazole 40mg ent tab” listed immediately above brand name Pantoloc 40mg.
51
Patented Medicines Prices Review Board, Generic Drugs in Canada, 2013 www.pmrb-cepmb.gc.ca
49
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development expenditures in Canada have dipped below $1 billion, and pharmaceutical
research and development in Canada has fallen by 29 percent since 2001.52
The Drug Approval Process in Canada
The drug approval process in Canada involves health law, patent law, and
administrative law. Health law regulates the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals
through the Food and Drugs Act,53 which is administered through the Therapeutic
Products Directorate of Health Canada. Patent law, as discussed, deals with the
monopolies granted for innovation within the industry through the Patent Act, which is
administered by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office. Administrative law plays an
important role in linking patent law and health law through the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations to facilitate the approval of pharmaceuticals in
Canada. Administrative law also creates the framework for the judicial review of
decisions related to approving generic medicines through the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations, the Federal Court Act,54 and the Federal Court Rules.55
The Food and Drugs Act and The Food and Drug Regulations56 encompass the
regulations for the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals required before approval to
manufacture, market, and sell can be granted. Sections 8 to 15 of the Food and Drugs
Act outline the general prohibitions on the manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs in
Canada, general requirements for sanitation and cleanliness, production facility

Taken from Industry Canada’s “Canadian Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (2014)” online:
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/lsg-pdsv.nsf/eng/h_hn01703.html. Investment decreased by 29 percent over
the period of 2001 to 2014.
53
RSC 1985, c F-27.
54
RSC, 1985, c F-7.
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SOR/98-106.
56
CRC, c 870, 2016.
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inspections, labelling requirements, and standardization requirements.57 Part C, Division
8, of the Food and Drug Regulations58 provides specific guidelines for new drugs and
generic drugs that are intended to be marketed and sold in Canada. Division Eight
regulations include clinical and safety study requirements, labelling requirements, and
any other requirements for obtaining a Notice of Compliance, which is a notice that a
drug product has successfully completed these requirements, and can therefore be
manufactured and sold. Division Eight also details the types of submissions allowed, and
the specific requirements for each type. The first type is the standard New Drug
Submission, which applies to drugs that have never been marketed and sold before in
Canada. The second type is the Abbreviated New Drug Submission, which is for generic
drugs, where a Notice of Compliance has already been granted to the innovator drug with
the same active ingredient, in the same strength, and same dosage form. The third type of
submission is the Extraordinary Use New Drug Submission, which sets out the regulatory
provisions for new drugs where it is not possible to conduct clinical trials on human

57

Data exclusivity is outlined in C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations. This provision protects the
safety and efficacy data of an innovative pharmaceutical for a minimum of eight years for a drug containing
a new medicinal ingredient not previously approved by Health Canada from the date of filing for a Notice
of Compliance. In this provision, a generic manufacturer cannot file for a submission for a copy of the data
for the first six years of the eight year period. Subsection 5(5) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations clarifies the data exclusivity provisions under Canada’s Access to Medicines
Regime, where the date for filing for the data is deemed to be six years after the issuance of a Notice of
Compliance for the innovator pharmaceutical. Data exclusivity is not an issue for investigation in this
thesis but is an issue for future study, as data exclusivity provisions can affect market exclusivity. An
extension to the data exclusivity period was recently rejected by Canada during negotiations of the CanadaEuropean Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement. However, it is likely to be an issue in
future international trade negotiations.
58
Supra note 56, c.08
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subjects.59 Health Canada publishes specific guidance documents for companies wishing
to file a drug submission of any type.60
Original Research – The Process for Drug Approval
New drug research begins with scientists developing new chemical or biological
substances. New substances are isolated and purified, then administered to tissue
cultures, called in vitro testing, and observed for physiological, biological, or behavioural
changes. Following promising in vitro results for a particular compound, in vivo testing
(animal testing) for pharmacological efficacy, pharmacokinetics, and toxicity begins.
Pharmacokinetic testing on animals tells researchers how that compound is distributed
throughout the body, how it is metabolized and eliminated, and whether or not it could
adversely affect human systems, like the reproductive system or the immune system.
Pharmacokinetic testing enables researchers to determine safe dosage ranges for humans
as well. Researchers also conduct experiments with high dosages to try to induce the
development of cancer cells in various tissues, providing information on the potential
carcinogenicity of a given compound. Through all of this experimentation and
monitoring, researchers develop a profile of potential side effects from the compound as
well. This stage of research, encompassing in vitro and in vivo testing on animals, is
known as pre-clinical testing.
If the initial tests indicate that the drug will be safe in humans, researchers file a
Clinical Trial Application61 to Health Canada’s Health Products and Food Branch
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For example, it is not possible to test an antidote on a human for a certain venomous snake bite, as it
would be impossible to infect the human subjects with the poisonous venom and then test the antidote.
60
Canada, Health Canada, Guidance Document: Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations,
File 15-101151-734, February 3, 2015. This document clarifies provisions within the Regulations.
61
Supra note 56, C.05.005.
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Inspectorate for authorization to conduct clinical trials in humans, for establishing the
effectiveness of a compound for specific indications. If granted, researchers conduct
Phase I Clinical Trials, where the drug is given to small groups of people, often between
twenty and eighty. The researchers gather preliminary data on the effectiveness of a drug
for a specified disease or condition. They try to attain clinical results in the test subjects
while maintaining a tolerable level of side effects. They also perform more safety
evaluation by determining safe dose ranges and the toxicity of the drug, and evaluate it
for potential interactions with other pharmaceuticals.
Following successful Phase I Clinical Trials, researchers file another Clinical
Trial Application62 and begin Phase II Clinical Trials, where the compound is given to
larger groups of people, typically of one hundred to three hundred, who have the
condition for which the drug is intended to treat. The larger studies are undertaken to
confirm the compound’s effectiveness, monitor its side effects, compare it to other
treatments for the same condition, and establish safety guidelines for safe use by the
public.
After successful Phase Two Clinical Trials, the researcher files another Clinical
Trial Application for Phase III Clinical Trials, with the primary objective of establishing
the efficacy of the new drug at differing dosages. Phase III Clinical Trials involve one
thousand to three thousand subjects with the targeted medical condition, often in multiple
study locations. Because of the large number of test subjects, there is a higher likelihood
that adverse reactions will be observed amongst the subjects, which are documented.
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Supra note 58. An application process is required for each type of clinical trial.
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If the results at the end of Phase III still look promising, a “New Drug
Submission” can be filed with the Health Products and Food Branch Inspectorate, which
includes the data contained in the clinical and preclinical studies. The data is submitted
in conjunction with information on how and where the drug will be produced. The
submission is reviewed to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the drug. If the Health
Products and Food Branch Inspectorate determine that the benefits of the drug outweigh
its potential risks, the drug is issued a Notice of Compliance and a Drug Identification
Number, which authorizes the manufacturer to produce and sell the drug in Canada.63
Post marketing surveillance of the new drug by the manufacturer is also required to
ensure the safety and effectiveness of the drug, even after it has been made available to
the public.
Following the issuance of a Notice of Compliance and a Drug Identification
Number, the drug company makes a decision as to whether it will market the drug
product. If it decides to move forward, the company submits its product summary
information to the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board,64 which reviews the
information and sets a price that is intended to reflect a balance among several factors,
including the cost of developing the product, the size of the market for the drug, and the
affordability of the drug to the consumer.
Following the establishment of a price, the drug company begins consultation
with federal and provincial drug plans to establish coverage for the product. Following
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The review period for a New Drug Application is typically two months to seven years, with an average of
two years. Supra note 47 at 418.
64
The Patented Medicines Prices Review Board was established in s 91 of the Patent Act through
amendment in 1987. The mandate, composition, and rules of the Board are set out from s 79(1) to s 103 of
the Patent Act.
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discussions about the efficacy of the product and a comparison to existing treatments,
listing and reimbursement decisions are made.
Following the discussion with drug plans, the company launches the product,
making it accessible to the public. Upon the launch, the company provides extensive
communications with physicians in accordance with the Notice of Compliance.
Specifically, the information must stipulate: the patient population for whom the drug can
be prescribed, the indications that the drug can treat, and the dosages that can be
administered. After the launch, additional therapeutic monitoring and cost-effectiveness
studies are performed, as well as adverse drug reaction monitoring, all of which
contribute to future decisions by both government and company officials about the
continued availability of the product.
Generic Drug Development
It is the Abbreviated New Drug Submission that is of primary concern in this
thesis, as this is the process for getting approval to manufacture and sell generic
medicines in Canada. This abbreviated submission process allows generic manufacturers
to sidestep the safety and efficacy requirements involved in the New Drug Submission,
only being required to demonstrate bioequivalence with the original product – it must be
the same product, and it must provide the same level of drug in the bloodstream, within
very narrow limits. It is the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations
which come into effect after the generic manufacturer has established bioequivalence and
wishes to have the product approved for marketing. If patents remain on the innovative
product, but the generic manufacturer feels that those patents are invalid or will not be
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infringed upon, it can allege these claims against the innovator, and invoke the
Regulations, which will be discussed after an introduction to patents.
Patenting and Innovation65
For any invention that meets the requirements outlined in the Patent Act,66 a
patent is granted to the inventor by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office. The patent
allows the inventor, or the owner of the patent, an exclusive time period to manufacture,
distribute, and sell the invention. In Canada, this exclusive period is twenty years from
the date of filing an application to patent the invention.67 In exchange for the monopoly,
the inventor must disclose a full description of the patent so that the information is
available for others to use as a stepping stone to further innovation.68 With respect to
medicines, the patent is granted for the advancement to medicine and health, in exchange
for disclosure of the patent, so that others may take that advancement and improve upon
it.
Section 2 of the Patent Act defines an invention as any “new and useful art,
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”69
From this definition, four key requirements can be set forth for all patents: novelty,
utility, non-obviousness, and patentable subject-matter.

For an introduction to patent theory and practice, consult David Vaver’s Intellectual Property Law:
Copyright, Patents, Trademarks, (2011), Toronto: Irwin Law. David Vaver is a professor of law,
specializing in the field of intellectual property at Osgoode Law School of York University.
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Novelty
The first requirement, that the subject matter is new,70 is met if the invention has
not yet been disclosed to the public.71 This requirement, known as novelty, means that
the patent cannot have been previously disclosed in Canada or elsewhere. An invention
that has been deemed to have been part of the prior art of a particular industry is not
novel. Paragraph 28.2(1) states that
The subject-matter, defined by a claim in an application for patent in Canada (the
“pending application”) must not have been disclosed
(a) more than one year before the filing date by the applicant, or by a person who
obtained knowledge, directly or indirectly, from the applicant, in such a
manner that the subject-matter became available to the public in Canada or
elsewhere;
(b) before the claim date by a person not mentioned in paragraph (a) in such a
manner that the subject-matter became available to the public in Canada or
elsewhere;
(c) in an application for a patent that is filed in Canada by a person other than the
applicant, and has a filing date that is before the claim date;…72
This provision also provides a grace period of one year for manufacturers who disclose
their invention to the public but have not yet filed the patent application.
With respect to pharmaceuticals, the patents in question are molecules that
represent new compositions of matter. These molecules may represent an “active
ingredient” that has an effect on the body, or they can represent new molecules that are
important aids in making sure that the active ingredient works, or is delivered to its
intended tissue in the body.
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Utility
The second requirement, that the invention be useful, means that the subject
matter of the patent must have some utility or benefit to the public, and therefore achieves
a purpose related to why it was invented. The patent must do what it promises, and
following the claims outlined in the patent should set out the method for making the
invention. Utility must be proven at the time of the application, or demonstrated by the
doctrine of sound prediction. This is particularly relevant for pharmaceuticals, since
demonstrating the utility of a new molecule for health purposes is difficult to do before
significant safety and efficacy testing can take place. This testing can take years; without
the doctrine of sound prediction, there would be no way to establish patent protection for
the new molecule. The doctrine of sound prediction is not set out within the Patent Act,
rather, it has developed through jurisprudence with three elements:
1) There must be a factual basis for the prediction;…
2) the inventor must have at the date of the patent application an articulable and
“sound” line of reasoning from which the desired result can be inferred from
the factual basis;….
3) There must be proper disclosure…of why the invention works.73
The opportunity to supply a theory as to why the invention works is contentious, as it is
difficult to assess the merits of the theory ahead of the data and testing required, making
it fairly easy to satisfy the element of utility. But the utility satisfied for the grant of a
patent has no bearing on subsequent challenges to that utility, as proceedings for
impeaching patents that do not meet the patent criteria after more data is made available,
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are set out in Section 60 of the Patent Act, and can be instituted at any time.74 This is
particularly relevant to pharmaceutical patents, where data about the efficacy of a
particular drug can only be determined after several years of testing on humans.75
Non-Obviousness
The third requirement is that the invention has a non-obvious step, as outlined in
s. 28.3 of the Patent Act, which states that “[t]he subject-matter must not have been
obvious on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it
pertains,…”76 This means that some ingenuity was not part of the prior art of the
particular industrial discipline of the invention. An invention can only be deemed to have
an inventive step (or be considered non-obvious) if a person skilled in the art related to
the industry of the invention would not have predicted the solution or mechanism
contained within that invention.77 If “any fool could have done that,”78 as asserted by
Justice Jugessen in Beloit Canada, there is no inventive step involved in the invention.
Obviousness can be a difficult concept. It may be obvious, for example, that two
plus two is four, but it is less obvious that changing one subgroup on a complicated
molecule that has been granted a patent could lead to a new patent for the new molecule.
There may have been some inventiveness in the chemical process for getting that new
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subgroup on the molecule, but that chemical process may be well-known to other
chemists who have applied it to other molecules. However, application of that chemical
step in this particular case, may lead to a compound with a new use, which should be
sufficient to meet the requirement of obviousness.
In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc.,79 Justice Rothstein summarized a
four-step approach to determine obviousness:
(1) (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”;
(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;
(2) Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or, if that cannot readily
be done, construe it;
(3) Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming
part of the “state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as
construed;
(4) Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those
differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled
in the art or do they require any degree of invention?80
However, Justice Rothstein warned against using the four-step approach as a rigid test of
obviousness, explaining that “in most matters in which a judge or a jury is called upon to
make a factual determination, rigid rules are inappropriate unless mandated by statute.”81
The test does squarely situate a medicinal chemist, organic chemist, or
pharmaceutical chemist as a notional person skilled in the art of making novel molecular
compounds as the person to which the test of obviousness must be applied, and it
identifies a body of knowledge held by these specialists. The test also states that the
inventive concept must be identified (if possible) and compared to the art that already
exists within the knowledge of that group of specialists. At this point, any differences
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with the inventive step to the existing art are evaluated to determine if they are significant
enough to constitute an invention.
The fourth part of the test in Sanofi-Synthelabo, known as the obvious-to-try test,
has been applied in subsequent pharmaceutical cases, notably Eli Lilly Canada Inc. et al v
Novopharm Limited,82 where Justice Layden-Stevenson, for the majority, states that “the
‘obvious to try’ inquiry will be appropriate in areas of endeavour where advances are
often won by experimentation, such as in the pharmaceutical industry.”83 Justice LaydenStevenson then references Sanofi-Synthelabo to identify factors to be taken into account
when assessing whether or not something was worth a try:
1. Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are
there a finite number of identified predictable solutions known to persons
skilled in the art?
2. What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the
invention? Are routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged
and arduous, such that trials would not be considered routine?
3. Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent
addresses?84
The obvious-to-try doctrine reigns-in pharmaceutical companies from creating a
blanket of patents across a range of related synthesized molecules. Companies could
apply a battery of processes to one molecule and patent thousands of molecules, based on
the ordinary application of chemistry across the entire range, with the hopes that one or
more molecule in the entire range holds promise. Obviousness, and the obvious-to-try
doctrine puts limits on this.
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Patentable Subject Matter
The fourth requirement is that the invention be patentable subject matter. Section
27(8) of the Patent Act provides that “No patent shall be granted for any mere scientific
principle or abstract theorem.” In general, what constitutes patentable subject matter is
defined by the five categories in the Patent Act definition in Section 2: “art, process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”85 “Art” has been defined as “the
application of knowledge to effect a desired result.”86 A process is “the application of a
method to a material or materials.”87 A process may be patentable even though the
process does not produce a product that is patentable.88 A machine is defined as “the
mechanical embodiment of any function or mode of operation designed to accomplish a
particular effect.”89 Manufacture “implies a product made by hand, by machine,
industrially, by mass production and so forth, by changing the character or condition of
material objects.”90 A composition of matter has been defined “as a combination of
ingredients – a solid, a gas, or fluid – as a chemical union or a physical mixture.”91 This
definition has come to include lower life forms, such as cells, enzymes, and genes, but
excludes multicellular organisms and higher life forms.92
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Infringement versus Impeachment
Patent infringement is the act of using the patent of another person or organization
without authorization - valid patents are given protection from this under the Patent Act.93
Impeachment refers to the process of challenging an existing patent in Federal Court to
have it declared void.94 With parties involved in patent litigation, impeachment is often a
counterclaim to an infringement claim, and vice versa.
Patent Litigation
Regardless of the underlying type of patent, a full dispute resolution mechanism is
available for litigating the validity of a patent.95 The majority of patent disputes at the
Supreme Court arise through the Federal Court of Canada, with leave to appeal to the
Federal Court of Appeal, followed by leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.96
There is, however, no law forbidding a patent infringement or invalidity case from being
initiated in any provincial jurisdiction. For example, in Beauchesne v Roy,97 Mr.
Beauchesne had a patent on a drill, but Mr. Marcotte was issued a patent for an
improvement upon Mr. Beauchesne’s patent. Mr. Marcotte started producing his drill,
and Mr. Beauchesne sought an injunction to stop the production, since the drill infringed
his patent. The Quebec Superior Court of Appeal held that the drill produced by Mr.
Marcotte did infringe on Mr. Beauchesne’s drill, since the Mr. Marcotte’s patented
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improvement did not allow him to infringe Mr. Beauchesne’s patent, which was still in
force. This case demonstrates that patent infringement suits can originate in provincial
court.
Regardless of the court, the dispute is brought as a patent infringement action
under Section 42 of the Patent Act, which establishes the rights of the patent holder:
Every patent granted under this Act shall contain the title or name of the
invention, with a reference to the specification, and shall, subject to this Act, grant
to the patentee and the patentee’s legal representatives for the term of the patent,
from the granting of the patent, the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of
making, constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used,
subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any court of competent
jurisdiction.98
After a decision at trial court is rendered, Section 63 of The Patent Act facilitates appeal
at any provincial appellate court or at the Federal Court of Appeal:
Every judgment voiding in whole or in part or refusing to void in whole or in part
any patent is subject to appeal to any court having appellate jurisdiction in other
cases decided by the court by which the judgment was rendered.99
Similarly, the Federal Courts Act, Section 27(1), indicates that there is wide scope for
appealing a decision at the Federal Court:
An appeal lies to the Federal Court of Appeal from any of the following decisions of
the Federal Court:
(a) a final judgment;
(b) a judgment on a question of law determined before trial;
(c) an interlocutory judgment; or
(d) a determination on a reference made by a federal board, commission or other
tribunal or the Attorney General of Canada. 100
As opposed to patent infringement, a dispute may also arise over the granting of a patent
by the Commissioner of Patents at the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Division of
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Patents. If a dispute arises as a result of an applicant who is denied a patent claim by the
Commissioner of Patents, the applicant files for action against the Commissioner in
Federal Court, as outlined in the Patent Act, Section 17:
In all cases where an appeal is provided from the decision of the Commissioner to
the Federal Court under this Act, the appeal shall be had and taken pursuant to the
Federal Courts Act and the rules and practice of that Court.101
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is confirmed in Section 41:
Every person who has failed to obtain a patent by reason of a refusal of the
Commissioner to grant it may, at any time within six months after notice as
provided for in section 40 has been mailed, appeal from the decision of the
Commissioner to the Federal Court and that Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine the appeal.102
A patent decision by a provincial court of final instance or by the Federal Court of
Appeal can be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada under Section 40 (1) of the
Supreme Court Act:
…an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any final or other judgment of the
Federal Court of Appeal or of the highest court of final resort in a province, or a
judge thereof, in which judgment can be had in the particular case sought to be
appealed to the Supreme Court, whether or not leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court has been refused by any other court, where, with respect to the particular
case sought to be appealed, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that any question
involved therein is, by reason of its public importance or the importance of any
issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in that question, one that
ought to be decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a
nature or significance as to warrant decision by it, and leave to appeal from that
judgment is accordingly granted by the Supreme Court.103
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Pharmaceutical Companies and Patent Litigation
When an innovative pharmaceutical company has an opportunity to oppose a
decision about generic approval, it is understandable that it would choose to do so,
resulting in a delay that extends the market life and profits of its branded
product,104whether it be through its rights under the Patent Act or through the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. To understand the enormity of the
litigation problem for generics under the current Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations,
Apotex recently claimed that in the last 10 years, it has spent $800 million on
litigation. Extrapolating from this to the other generic and brand firms, it appears
that annual litigation costs relating to pharmaceuticals in Canada are in the
hundreds of millions of dollars, chiefly for litigation between generic and brand
name firms. Indeed, there are in order of 100 Federal Court cases each year
involving pharmaceutical patents.105
According to Grootendorst and Hollis, “Apotex alone has been a party in 432 different
cases considered by the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal since 1997.”106
Innovative pharmaceutical companies are so opposed to generic competition that
they oppose subsequent challenges by follow-on generic companies even after losing the
initial challenge from the first generic company. Such was the case with Sanofi-Aventis’
blockbuster hypertension drug Altace (with the generic name of ramipril), with its novel
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angiotensin converting enzyme mechanism.107 Sanofi lost its first challenge from generic
manufacturer Apotex,108 which filed Notices of Allegations against several of Sanofi’s
patents. Apotex was subsequently issued a Notice of Compliance to produce the drug.
When three generic manufacturers followed suit and issued Notices of Allegation over
Sanofi’s same patents, Sanofi still defended its patents, even though they had been found
to be invalid.109
The best evidence of the aggressive posture of innovative pharmaceutical
companies toward the generic manufactures is that approximately one-half to two-thirds
of the litigated pharmaceutical patents through the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations are found to be invalid or not infringed.110 By challenging
these patents, generic manufacturers allow entry of a generic earlier than would otherwise
occur. Lipitor (atorvastatin), a popular cholesterol-lowering drug, has patent expiry dates
as late as 2022, but generic challenges to these patents resulted in generic alternatives
twelve years before the expiry of the last patent.111
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A History of Compulsory Licencing and the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations
Regulatory approval and patent protection of pharmaceuticals remained distinct
until 1993, governed independently by the Food and Drugs Act and the Patent Act. In
1993, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations linked the two regimes
in order to expedite the approval process of generic pharmaceuticals. Prior to 1993,
Canada had a compulsory licencing system through the Patent Act, where a generic
manufacturer could apply for a licence to manufacture and sell a patented pharmaceutical
product without the consent of the holder of the patent:
(a) Where the invention is a process, to use the invention for the preparation or
production of medicine, import any medicine in the preparation or production
of which the invention has been used or sell any medicine in the preparation
or production of which the invention has been used, or (b) where the invention
is other than a process, to import, make, use or sell the invention for medicine
or for the preparation or production of medicine….112
In exchange for a compulsory licence, the generic manufacture was required to
pay a four percent royalty to the brand manufacturer for the duration of any patents
covering the drug.113 Criteria for issuing a compulsory licence were never specified, and
the issuance of licences to generic manufacturers was routine. In 1984, the Government
of Canada established the Eastman Commission,114 which determined that almost 80
percent of applications for compulsory licences in Canada were granted between 1969
and 1983,115 which meant that there was really very little patent protection available for
112
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innovative pharmaceuticals. It did, however, indicate that compulsory licencing
contributed to the growth of the generic pharmaceutical industry in Canada, which saved
consumers $211 million in 1983 on medicine sales totalling $1.6 billion.116 In 1987, the
government passed Bill C-22, An Act to Amend the Patent Act and to Provide for Certain
Matters in Relation Thereto117 in order to address the recommendations of the Eastman
Commission. Bill C-22 amended the Patent Act to guarantee new drugs given a Notice
of Compliance a minimum of ten years of exclusivity before compulsory licences could
be issued to imported copies of the drug, and seven years of exclusivity after the issuance
of a Notice of Compliance before compulsory licences could be issued to companies
manufacturing that drug in Canada.118 For drugs invented and manufactured in Canada,
additional protection was granted, in that a compulsory licence could not be granted to an
imported copy of that drug at all.119 Under these circumstances, a compulsory licence
could only be granted for seven years after the issuance of the Notice of Compliance if
the inventor did not manufacture the drug in Canada for the purpose of supplying the
Canadian market.120
Bill C-22 also balanced the increased level of patent protection afforded to
patented medicines producers by introducing price controls through the creation of the
Patented Medicines Prices Review Board (PMPRB). The board’s mandate was to ensure
that the prices of patented medicines do not become excessive by setting the maximum
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price at which the patentee can sell the medicine, thereby balancing the additional patent
protection afforded under the bill.
Compulsory Licencing and International Trade Agreements
Two major developments in international trade led to the eventual removal of
compulsory licences from the Patent Act: the North American Free Trade Agreement,
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.121 Through
NAFTA, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States agreed to “foster
creativity and innovation, and promote trade in goods and services that are the subject of
intellectual property rights.”122 In addition, one of the objectives of NAFTA was to
“provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
in each Party’s territory.”123 Article 1704 permits each country to specify in its domestic
laws licencing measures to prevent or control “abuse of intellectual property rights
having an adverse effect on competition.”124 The specifics of compulsory licencing are
established in paragraph ten, Article 1709,125 which set out the duration, scope,
remuneration, and that the purpose for compulsory licencing must be only to supply the
domestic market of the country in question.126
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral trade
agreement established in 1947 to reduce international trade barriers among United
Nations member states.127 The Marrakesh Agreement was the final round of negotiations
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of GATT, which established the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the forum for
negotiating agreements, reducing trade obstacles, and settling trade disputes:128
The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.129
TRIPS, a comprehensive multilateral intellectual property agreement annexed to the
Marrakesh agreement, requires that domestic laws of signatory countries meet minimum
standards related to all aspects of intellectual property, including patents, trademarks,
copyright, industrial design, geographical indicators, plant variety protection, integrated
circuit protection, trade secrets, and test data.130 Ratification of TRIPS is a prerequisite to
WTO membership,131 and all 153 member states have ratified the agreement, including
Canada. In 1991, the then Director-General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, compiled the
Draft Final Act for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, which also
contained the draft agreement on TRIPS. The text created by Dunkel was endorsed by
the federal government in 1992 when it signed TRIPS. The text of NAFTA was also
finalized in Chapter 17, which was largely based on the text of the TRIPS Agreement.
TRIPS Article 31, “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” 132 addresses
compulsory licencing, and is almost identical to Article 1709.10 of NAFTA.
The text of Article 31 of TRIPS became available to the governments of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico while negotiating NAFTA in 1991, which explains

128

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr 15, `994, 1867 UNTS 154; 33
ILM 1144 (1994), Annex J, Art 2.
129
Ibid, Art II, para 1.
130
Supra note 4, Part I and II.
131
Supra note 128 at Art XXXIV. This article states that the annexes to GATT are an integral part of the
agreement. TRIPs is contained in Annex 1C of GATT.
132
Supra note 4, Art 31.

46

the similarity in the provisions in Chapter 17 of NAFTA, covering copyright, sound
recordings, trademarks, and patents. As indicated by a member of the Canadian TRIPS
and NAFTA negotiating teams, “NAFTA closely tracks the language of the 1991 Dunkel
draft of the TRIPS negotiating text. Therefore, NAFTA’s Chapter 17 and TRIPS
generally are textually close enough to ensure that interpretations of the meaning of one
would be directly relevant to the interpretation of the other. Findings of NAFTA panels
regarding intellectual property issues may therefore powerfully influence TRIPS
interpretation and vice versa.”133
On January 1, 1994, legislation implementing NAFTA came into force in
Canada.134 On January 1, 1995, Canada became a member of TRIPS.135 Because of the
obligations in Chapter 17 of NAFTA and Article 31 in TRIPS, Canada removed almost
all of its compulsory licencing provisions from Section 39 of the Patent Act through Bill
C-91, the Patent Act Amendment Act.136 Since both agreements prohibited the
discrimination by field of technology, Bill C-91 removed all provisions related
specifically to food and medicine,137 and provisions related to discrimination based on
imported or domestically manufactured goods were also removed in the NAFTA
Implementation Act.138 This eliminated the provisions related to compulsory licences in
Bill C-22.
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Without compulsory licencing, there was no legal mechanism for challenging the
validity of patents on innovative pharmaceuticals before expiry, short of initiating patent
impeachment actions, which would have raised the cost and extended the time for
developing generics. By implementing the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations in 1993, the premature marketing and sale of generics was blocked, but
generic manufacturers were given an opportunity to challenge patent status on innovative
pharmaceuticals in advance of the expiration of their patents. This is articulated through
Health Canada’s stated pharmaceutical patent policy objective, which is to “balance the
effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely entry of their
lower priced generic competitors.”139 This aim of balancing motivations was recognized
by the judiciary in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), where Justice
Binnie stated that “it seems clear that the NOC regulations were introduced to help
generic drug companies and at the same time to curb potential patent abuse by them.”140
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations are consistent with
the protection of patents in the Patent Act, as explained by Section 55.2(4) of the Patent
Act:
The Governor in Council may make such regulations as the Governor in Council
considers necessary for preventing the infringement of a patent by any person
who makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing
regulations: (a) respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled before a notice,
certificate, permit or other document concerning any product to which a patent
may relate may be issued to a patentee or other person under any Act of
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Parliament that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of that product
in addition to any conditions provided for by or under that Act.141
This section indicates that the government can make additional regulations for preventing
infringement, and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations were
borne out of this possibility. The Regulations define the conditions under which an
application for a generic drug will be approved for manufacture, sale, and distribution in
Canada. Besides outlining the terms for approval when the patents on an innovative drug
expires, it outlines the conditions for challenging existing patents on medicines that may
not be valid or relevant to the drug that the generic manufacturer wishes to copy. The
provisions of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations will be
explained in Chapter Four.
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Chapter Four: The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations - Elements
and Issues involving Health Law, Patent Law, and Judicial Review142
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations are the roadmap for
the approval of generic pharmaceuticals in Canada. The Regulations provide for a Patent
Register where all patents on approved medicines in Canada must be registered, and also
provide the framework for generic manufacturers to challenge the validity or applicability
of those patents, which may be unnecessarily holding up the genericization of a particular
medicine. A discussion of judicial review, and how a challenge through the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations operates within the framework of judicial
review is essential to the analysis in Chapter Six, since the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases will be compared directly to the copyright cases, which also arrived at
the Supreme Court after judicial review. Finding a similar pattern of decision making
could suggest that it is the judicial review process that is problematic, providing a cue for
further investigation into its elements. A discussion of the potential shortcomings of
judicial review within the context of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations will also ensue.
Section Four – Health Canada’s Patent Register
Through Section 4(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations, the Minister of Health has a duty to maintain a Patent Register, which lists
all of the patents that have been deemed to be relevant to a particular innovative
pharmaceutical approved for sale in Canada. Any new drug product going through the
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approval process must submit its associated patents to the Minister of Health,143 who
decides which patents for a given pharmaceutical qualify and can therefore be listed on
the Patent Register. The Minister has a duty to determine which patents should or should
not get listed, as well as which should be removed, should a patent expire or be declared
invalid by the court for a particular pharmaceutical. The patents listed on the Register are
given protection under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations so
that generic companies cannot legally use them before expiry or a successful challenge to
their inclusion on the Register. To be included on the Register, the patents must be filed
at the same time as the overall submission and be of appropriate subject matter. 144 The
patentable subject matter can include claims for the medicine itself (which would the
actual molecule, known as the active ingredient), structural variants of the molecule that
arise during its synthesis,145 novel dosage forms for carrying the medicine,146 and the
medical uses of the medicine.147 All of these claims must be relevant to the drug product
undergoing approval. 148
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Section Five – Filing Notices of Allegation
Section Five of the Regulations requires that a manufacturer making an
Abbreviated New Drug Submission for a generic medicine address the patents for the
innovative pharmaceutical on the Patent Register. The generic manufacturer must either
wait for the patents on the innovator product to expire before getting a Notice of
Compliance149 or allege that 1) the innovator’s patents are invalid, 2) the innovator’s
patents are improperly included on the Patent Register, or 3) the innovator’s patents will
not be infringed by the generic manufacturer.150 The section requires the generic
manufacturer to address each relevant patent on the Patent Register and send separate
Notices of Allegation to the innovator that outline the factual and legal details of each
patent improperly listed.151
Section Six – Order of Prohibition Application and the Twenty-Four Month Stay
The innovator must respond to the allegations within forty-five days of receipt of
the Notices of Allegation.152 The innovator can accept the allegations, in which case a
Notice of Compliance will issue to the generic company, allowing them to manufacture
and sell the generic drug. But the innovator company usually commences an application
for an Order of Prohibition in Federal Court to stop the Minister of Health from issuing a
Notice of Compliance to the generic manufacturer.153 When it is filed, a twenty-four
month stay is automatically granted,154 prohibiting the Minister of Health from issuing a
Notice of Compliance within this period, unless the court decides in favour of the generic
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company in the meantime, or the patents expire before the end of the stay.155 Therefore,
filing for the Order of Prohibition operates as an automatic injunction to stop the approval
of the generic.156 If the summary proceedings has not been completed within twenty-four
months, the Minister is free to issue the Notice of Compliance.157
Section 7 – Conditions for Issuing a Notice of Compliance
Section 7 outlines the conditions that allow a Notice of Compliance to be issued,
which include the expiration of the relevant patents, and the declaration of registered
patents as being invalid or non-infringed. If approval is achieved through the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, a Notice of Compliance is issued, which
allows for the manufacture, distribution, and sale of the pharmaceutical product in
Canada.
Section 8 - Damages
Section 8 specifies damages awarded to generics if a judicial review is lost by an
innovator company on appeal by a generic. The amount of damages is computed from
the point in time when the generic could have been introduced into the market, if the
innovator had not challenged the generic manufacturer’s allegations.
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Litigation Following the Notice of Allegation
Proceeding in a Summary Way
Once the innovator files the application for an Order of Prohibition, the twentyfour-month stay is granted, and all ensuing litigation proceeds by way of judicial review
through the Federal Court. Section 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act158 facilitates the
commencement of the judicial review process:
An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or an order of a federal
board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within 30 days after the time
the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or
other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the
party directly affected by it….159
Rule 300(a) of the Federal Court Rules directs that all applications for judicial review are
subject to the rules in Part 5 of the Federal Court Rules.160 Therefore, all applications for
judicial review in questions arising from the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations are subject to Part 5, Rules 300 to 334. Rule 300(b) reaffirms that
“proceedings required or permitted by or under an Act of Parliament to be brought by
application, motion, originating notice of motion, originating summons or petition are to
be determined in a summary way….”161
Judicial Review Answers One Question Only
Rule 302 of the Federal Court Rules states that a judicial review is limited to a
single order. This reaffirms that the purpose of the review is to determine if the Minister
shall be prohibited from granting the Notice of Compliance to the generic and it therefore
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cannot be a determination of patent infringement or invalidity, as this would amount to a
second and different order. Rule 302 promotes expediency in the process but it is the
inability to adjudicate the validity of the patents combined with the abbreviated process
of judicial review that creates the perception that the rules allow Canada to sidestep its
international obligations under TRIPs and NAFTA.
In this context, judicial review focuses on the reasonableness of the Minister of
Health in registering the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register in light of the
evidence from both sides. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that patent validity
cannot be adjudicated during this process in Merck Frosst v Minister of National Health
and Welfare.162 The court appeared to also be somewhat mystified by the legislation,
stating that the drafters must have “had in mind the possibility of there being a parallel
proceeding instituted by the [generic] which might give rise to such a declaration and be
binding on the parties.”163
Presumption of Truth of the Allegations
Section 6(2) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations states
that “the court shall make an order pursuant to subsection [6](1) in respect of a patent that
is the subject of one or more allegations if it finds that none of those allegations is
justified.”164 Therefore, the allegations made by the generic applicant are presumed to be
true until the innovator company proves otherwise, in which case the Notice of
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Compliance will not be granted.165 If the innovator cannot cast doubt on the allegations,
the Minister is obliged to issue the Notice of Compliance.
Judicial Review – Reading the Evidence
Since the review proceeds summarily, both sides submit evidence, briefs,
statements by expert witnesses, and cross examinations of those witnesses, with respect
to the particular allegations of the generic company. The judge examines the written
material, hears oral summary arguments, then renders a decision on whether or not the
Minister acted reasonably when he added the patents to the Patent Register.
Hatch-Waxman Legislation in the United States – a Comparison to the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations
Linkage regulations in the United States existed for nearly ten years before they
did in Canada. In 1984, the United States passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.166 This legislation is
similar to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in that both
provide a linked process for the expeditious approval of generic pharmaceuticals. Similar
to the Canadian system, the generic applicant files an Abbreviated New Drug
Application, where the applicant only must demonstrate bioequivalence to the branded
product. Like the corresponding Canadian regulations, all of the safety and efficacy data
provided by the manufacturer of the innovative pharmaceutical is relied upon, which
greatly reduces the cost of the approval process. Also like the Canadian process, the
Hatch-Waxman Act requires the generic manufacturer to address all of the patents for a
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particular innovative pharmaceutical, which are listed in the United States’ Food and
Drug Administration’s “Orange Book.”167 The generic manufacturer must specify for
each patent that: 1) the patent has expired, 2) the patent will expire before the generic is
approved, 3) the patent has not been filed, or 4) the patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the generic manufacturer’s actions. The generic manufacturer must submit
an opinion to the patent holder, called a Paragraph IV Certification, as to the legal and
factual reasons why certain patents are invalid, or will not be infringed.
When an Abbreviated New Drug Application is filed with a Paragraph IV
Certification, the generic applicant is deemed to have infringed the innovator company’s
patents, giving it a cause of action for patent infringement.168 The innovator has 45 days
from the receipt of the Paragraph IV Certification to file an action for infringement.169
Once the action is filed, the Abbreviated New Drug Application is automatically stayed
for thirty months, unless the patents expire in the meantime, or judgment is passed in the
action to deem the patents invalid or non-infringed.170
Since the litigation for infringement is an action, adjudication over the validity of
the patents is made according to the rules established in the United States Patents Act.
This highlights the key differences between the Patented Medicines (Notice of
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Compliance) Regulations and the Hatch-Waxman Act: the Hatch-Waxman Act links
generic market approval and patent validity by incorporating the process of infringement
proceedings under the Patent Act, whereas the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations only review whether or not Health Canada acted reasonably in
including the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register. The infringement action
incorporated into the Hatch-Waxman Act provides both parties with the opportunity for
full discovery, including the examination and cross examination of witnesses in person.
It provides a binding court decision that affords equal rights of appeal for both the
innovator and the generic company, but the legislation still allows the Food and Drug
Administration to issue permission to market the product before an appeal.171 The
litigation is streamlined compared to that in Canada, in that there is no secondary
litigation process beyond the action and an appeal. In Canada, judicial review can always
be followed by a separate action for infringement. This can lead to a perception that the
judicial review process is ineffective, because it is, indeed, inconclusive on the issue of
patent validity.
Length of Proceedings: Actions take longer than Summary Proceedings
Seeing that the average time to complete a judicial review is fourteen months,172 it
is unlikely that a full determination of infringement or invalidity could be finalized within
this time period, making the abbreviated process of judicial review advantageous. In the
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United States, a thirty-month stay period is granted173 for infringement actions, but that
period is often exceeded,174 so it is reasonable to expect that actions at the Federal Court
in Canada would also take considerable time. The complexities of a trial necessarily
slow its progression.
The current judicial review process affords several provisions related to
expediting the process in Part 5 of the Federal Court Rules: 175
1. … an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single order in
respect of which relief is sought.176
2. …within 10 days after the issuance of a notice of application, the applicant
shall serve it on (a) all respondents.177
3. A respondent who intends to appear in respect of an application shall, within
ten days of being served with a notice of application, serve and file a notice of
appearance in Form 305.178
4. Within 30 days after issuance of a notice of application, an applicant shall
serve its supporting affidavits and documentary exhibits and file proof of
service….179
5. Within 30 days after service of the applicant’s affidavits, a respondent shall
serve its supporting affidavits and documentary exhibits and shall file proof of
service….180
6. Cross examinations on affidavits must be completed by all parties within 20
days after the filing of the respondent’s affidavits….181
7. An applicant shall serve and file the applicant’s record within 20 days after
the day on which the parties’ cross-examinations are completed or within 20
days after the day on which the time for those cross-examinations is expired,
whichever day is earlier.182
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Therefore, the rules in Part 5 set out specific time frames in order to keep the judicial
review process moving along efficiently. For actions initiated in Federal Court, the rules
in Part 4 of the Federal Court Rules apply, and have similar timelines established in
Regulations 203 to 207,183 but because the proceedings include a trial, the rules are more
extensive, covering the pleadings, rules for the statement of claim, rules for counterclaim,
preliminary objections, motion rules, discovery, evidence rules, expert witness rules, and
trial rules. Undoubtedly, pursuing a trial, with discovery and live witnesses will increase
the time for adjudication. In addition, an action can encompass a complete statement of
claim for infringement and a counterclaim for impeachment, so there can be multiple
issues during the trial, lengthening the process. In contrast, the judicial review process
adjudicates one question only, that being the reasonableness of the decision made by
Health Canada to list the innovator’s patents on the Patent Register.184 Switching to an
infringement action would therefore require a lengthening of the prohibition time from
twenty-four months to thirty months, as under Hatch-Waxman, or to some length of time
that fits with the expected duration of the trial.185
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
As a signatory to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement,186 Canada is obliged to comply with the protection given to patent holders
under the agreement. The complaint brought forward by the European Communities and
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their Member States in 1997187 alleged that Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations do not provide adequate protection for patent holders, since the
legislation provided an opportunity for generic manufacturers to challenge a patent
holder’s rights through the judicial review process, which, as mentioned, does not
encompass a full action, and has unequal appeal rights. The European Union alleged that
the imposition of these Regulations meant that holders of pharmaceutical patents were
treated less favourably than patent holders in other industries. Through the abbreviated
process of judicial review, a generic manufacturer could be issued a Notice of
Compliance, even though the patent holder still has patent rights conferred under the
Patent Act. The European Member States stated that the rules that allowed Canada to
treat pharmaceutical patent holders less favourably than patent holders in other industries,
and was therefore in violation of Article 27.1, which states that
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.188
However, the opposite view of Canada’s Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations was taken by Canada – the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations provide additional protection of the patent holder’s rights for
the term of the patent, and only allow for a Notice of Compliance of a generic challenger

187

Supra note 5. The panel did rule on the issue of the abbreviated process, but the primary
recommendations were related to the experimental and regulatory use exemption and the stockpiling
provisions. The experimental use provision allows competitors of patents to begin developing the
competitive product before the expiration of the patents. The stockpiling provisions allow a generic
manufacturer to manufacture and stockpile inventory of a generic medicine, but not sell it until the relevant
patents expire.
188
Supra note 4 at art 27.1.

61

if it has been reasonably determined that the patents held were not applicable to the
original drug product. The World Trade Organization decision panel agreed, stating
In further examining the Canadian laws currently in force, one could see that they
even went beyond the TRIPS Agreement by protecting, in addition, the rights of
pharmaceutical patent holders through the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, which ensured and enhanced the realization of the
exclusive rights during the term of the patent.189
Despite the report of the panel, Canada could adjust the Regulations to be similar to
Hatch-Waxman, where the infringement action is automatically triggered when the
Notices of Allegation are filed, as this would make Canada’s linkage laws align with
Hatch-Waxman, preventing future conflict. However, complaints about the process are
not necessarily warranted. Judges review the cases and determine if Health Canada acted
appropriately when it decided to disallow certain patents to hold up the generic approval
process, and there is no clear evidence that this cannot be done accurately, and separately,
from assessing infringement.190
Burden of Proof in a Summary Proceedings
The burden of proof is the onus on one litigant to establish the merits of the case
brought to the court. The burden of proof for refuting the allegations made by the generic
company about the invalidity of the innovator’s patents is borne by the party that brought
the application for an Order of Prohibition, which is the patent holder, who becomes the
“mover” or the “first person.”
The burden is established in Rule 301(e) of the Federal Court Rules, which states
that the applicant must include with its application “a complete and concise statement of
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the grounds intended to be argued, including a reference to any statutory provision or rule
to be relied on.”191 This was affirmed in Frosst Canada Inc. et al v Canada (Minister of
National Health and Welfare),192 that a party moving under Section 6 of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations was judged to bear the burden of proof in
the proceedings. At the commencement of the proceedings, the judge therefore presumes
that the allegations made by the generic about patent invalidity are true (as discussed
above), and the patent holder must demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the
allegations in the Notices of Allegation are not justified. Therefore, the patent holder
bears the legal burden of establishing why his patents are valid by directing arguments
against the allegations in the Notices of Allegation. The filer of the Notices of Allegation,
the generic company, holds the evidential burden, which is the provision of evidence of
patent invalidity in that notice. In Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v Canada (Minister of
National Health and Welfare), the Federal Court of Appeal summarized the burden of
proof:
The initial burden of proof is known, in a civil case, as the persuasive burden or
the legal burden and it is the burden of establishing a case to the civil standard of
proof. By contrast, the evidential burden consists of a burden of putting an issue
in play and means that a party has the responsibility to ensure that there is
sufficient evidence of the existence or non-existence of a fact or an issue on the
record to pass the threshold for that particular fact or issue.193
This affirms that the generic company produces the evidence of invalidity or noninfringement, while the innovator company bears the legal burden to refute the evidence
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in a judicial review. The generic manufacturer would bear a legal burden for a separate
action where the innovator is claiming infringement in a patent action, but not in this
case, where it is applying for a judicial review under the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations. This is the statutory burden of proof created in the Federal
Court Rules, section 301(e).
If the legislation was instead drafted to be an infringement action, the generic
manufacturer would be deemed to have infringed, and therefore bear the legal burden,
consistent with the rules for an action and Canada’s Patent Act. The presumption of
validity in section 43(2) of the Patent Act, states that “After the patent is issued, it shall,
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, be valid and avail the patent holder and
the legal representatives of the patent holder for the term mentioned in section 44 or 45,
whichever is applicable.”194 The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations reverse this onus, so that the patent holder defends its previously issued
patents.
Judicial Review – the Standard of Review
The judicial review process is a summary proceeding which operates to oversee
areas of administrative law, like decisions to list patents on the Patent Register, made by
the Therapeutic Products Directorate’s Office of Patented Medicines Liaison (a branch of
the Therapeutic Products Directorate of Health Canada). The judge renders a decision,
whether on the balance of probabilities, the allegations are justified. The innovator
attempts to demonstrate that Health Canada acted reasonably when it decided to include
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the patents on the Patent Register, making the allegations of the generic manufacturer
unreasonable.
The standard of review under the original Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations was “patent and reasonable.” The determination of the
standard of review of patent and reasonableness or correctness in a judicial review of a
Notice of Compliance application was affirmed in Ferring Inc. v Canada (Minister of
Health),195 where the Court determined that the standard of review was correctness for
questions of law, and patent and reasonableness for questions of fact, referring to AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health).196 Where there was mixed questions
of law and fact, Richard C.J. stated that “the standard of review is patent and
reasonableness unless the question of law is extricable from the question of fact in which
case the question of law is determined on the basis of correctness.”197 Since legal rules
were being applied to factual evidence regarding patents on the Patent Register, the
standard of review was appropriately patent and reasonable.
Decisions made by way of judicial review, where the standard of review was
deemed to be patent and reasonable, was changed to “reasonableness” by Dunsmuir v
New Brunswick.198 Pharmascience Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) affirmed the
applicability of the standard of review for new drug submissions under the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations:
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[2007] FCA 276, [2007] FCJ 1138.
[2004] FC 1277, at para 33.
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Ibid at para 7, 8.
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The test for reasonableness is described in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 SCR 190, 2008 SCC 9
at 47. Three of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases had been decided by the time the
standard was changed. Addressing the impact of the change on the cases may be a point for future
research.
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A decision by the Minister of Health to accept or reject a new drug submission is
a question of mixed fact and law. Accordingly, such a decision will be reviewed
on the standard of reasonableness, where the issues involve both fact and law.199
This affirmed that the judge conducting a judicial review over the issuance of a Notice of
Compliance to a generic manufacturer gives the Office of Patented Medicines Liaison
significant deference when making a decision about including patents on the Patent
Register. If the allegation by the generic company involves patent invalidity, the judge
may in fact consider evidence in relation to the Patent Act as well as patent jurisprudence
to decide the validity of patent claims, but the judgment will fall short of assessing actual
patent infringement, which can only be determined through an infringement proceeding
under the regular trial process, where the standard of review is correctness. Therefore,
the standard of reasonableness applies to applications for judicial review of decisions to
grant a Notice of Compliance, where deference is given to the Minister’s decision for
inclusion on the Patent Register. An actual determination of patent validity would occur
under the standard of review of correctness.
In Abbott Laboratories Limited v Attorney General of Canada (Minister of
Health), Justice Hughes confirmed the standard of review:
Given that we are in a post-Dunsmuir environment, a standard of patent
unreasonableness no longer can apply. However, on the standard of
reasonableness, considerable deference still should be given to decisions of the
Minister where the questions are those of mixed fact and law as well as those of
fact alone.
In summary:
1. Patent claim construction is a matter of law to be reviewed on a standard of
correctness.
2. The uses approved by the existing Notice of Compliance are questions of fact
and are to be reviewed on this basis of reasonableness with considerable
deference given to the Minister’s decision.
3. The consideration as to how the uses claimed in the patent compare with those
approved by the Notice of Compliance for purposes of section 4(2)(d) of the
199

Pharmascience Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) 2008 FCA 258, [2008] FCJ 1269 at para 5.
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Notice of Compliance Regulations involves mixed fact and law and considerable
deference should be given to the Minister’s decision.200
The applicability of reasonableness as the standard of review meshes with the
determinations that are made by the Office of Patented Medicines Liaison at Health
Canada. Since Health Canada is determining the suitability of medicines for treating
specific diseases, it is Health Canada, as the evaluator of the facts that will allow the use
of the medicine for specific conditions, and its personnel have the appropriate
background for doing so. Even though the patents involved claim a use (usually based on
the doctrine of sound prediction), the actual use becomes the medical conditions for
which the medication is approved by Health Canada, and upon which the Notice of
Compliance is issued to the innovator. It is therefore the factual evidence provided in
support of that actual use, applied to those particular patents upon which the approved
clinical use is based that becomes the decision making points for Health Canada in
determining whether a patent should be listed on the Patent Register.201 It is not making
outright determinations of patent validity, which makes the judicial review process
suitable.

200

Abbott Laboratories v Canada (Minister of Health), (2008) FC 700, [2007] FCJ 543. Section 4(2)(d)
states that “A patent on a patent list in relation to a new drug submission is eligible to be added to the
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When innovator pharmaceutical companies apply for patents on drug molecules, they have a theory and
some empirical evidence from experimentation as to what health problem the molecule will treat, but they
often do not have specific evidence, since all research at this point is at the molecular level. Allowing for
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Rights of Appeal
If a patent holder loses the judicial review at the Federal Court, the Notice of
Compliance is granted, and there is no chance of an effective appeal for the patent holder,
as the Minister of Health must issue the Notice of Compliance to the generic company
through Section 7(2)(b), which states that the Minister must not withhold a Notice of
Compliance if the court has declared that the patents are not valid, or would not be
infringed. If the allegations are dismissed, the generic company has the right to appeal
the decision to the Federal Court of Appeal for further judicial review, and possibly to the
Supreme Court of Canada.202
Even if a patent holder has an unfavorable judgment from the judicial review, it
does not stop the patent holder from filing a separate action for infringement. At this
point, however, the generic company is not prohibited from selling the generic drug, and
the patent holder suffers a massive erosion in the market share of its innovative drug203
because of the price difference. It may also be difficult for the patent holder to get an
injunction to stop the sale of the generic, since the judge will know that the summary
proceedings determined that the patents should not have been registered on the Patent
Register administered by Health Canada. Therefore, the judge may refrain from forming
an opinion and making an injunction. This loss of an effective appeal also differentiates
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The cases emanating from Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations heard at the
Supreme Court of Canada were listed in Table One, Chapter One. A qualitative analysis of the cases is
presented in Chapter Six.
203
The profits can be reclaimed as damages through Section 8 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, but the law on damages is unclear when a determination of patent infringement
has been made following a successful application for judicial review by a generic manufacturer and the
granting of a Notice of Compliance.
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the judicial review process under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations from an infringement action under the Patent Act.204
The appeal rights between the patent holder and the generic challenger are
illustrated in Figure One, which shows the outcomes for each party when different
decisions are handed down at different levels of court. The dashed arrows represent
avenues where a summary proceedings under the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations has finished, but the patent holder still has an opportunity for
initiating a new action for patent infringement.

204

As discussed earlier, the United States’ Hatch-Waxman Act does not hold up the approval process for a
generic medicine once the initial challenge is lost either.

69

Figure 1: Summary of Litigation Proceeding from PM(NOC) Regulations
Notice of Allegation Issued by Generic
(PM(NOC) S.5)

Innovator Application:
Order of Prohibition
(PM(NOC) S.6(1))

Summary Proceedings at Federal
Court (FC)
-

Judicial review
Did Minister act reasonably by
including patents on register?
Not an action for infringement

Did not act
reasonably

Acted reasonably
Generic applies

NOC Granted
to Generic
(S.7)

Federal Court
of Appeal

New Patent
Impeachment
Litigation (FC)
Generic applies

Innovator applies

Did not act
reasonably

New Patent
Infringement
Litigation (FC)

Acted reasonably
Generic applies
S 40(1) Supreme Court Act

Innovator applies

NOC Granted
to Generic
(S.7)

Supreme Court of Canada
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Chapter Five: A Review of Relevant Decision Making Studies
The first step in establishing the direction for future research on the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations will be to document the decision making
patterns in the cases and compare them to the Supreme Court patent case data, the
copyright data, as well as the general Supreme Court decision making data. Previous
decision making studies on the Supreme Court come from authors Donald Songer,205
Julia Siripurapu,206 Peter McCormick,207 Emmett Macfarlane,208 and Christine Joseph.209
Songer and Siripurapu studied unanimous decisions at the Supreme Court between 1970
and 2003, with an emphasis on the period of 1982 to 2003, a period of new Charter of
Rights and Freedoms activity at the Supreme Court. McCormick’s contributions came
through two publications, one of which provides data on unanimity at the Supreme
Court210 while the other provides data and analysis of concurring reasons at the Supreme
Court between 1984 and 2006.211 Macfarlane also studied unanimity at the Supreme
Court, but focussed his research on interviews with Supreme Court Justices (current and
retired), law clerks of the Justices, and other staff members. Joseph performed a
comprehensive study of solo dissents at the Supreme Court, covering all of the 133 solo
dissents between 1974 and 2003.
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However, the purpose of these previous studies was not to develop a pattern of
decision making for comparison to other cases. Rather, the purpose of these articles was
to try to determine what forces were driving judges to make decisions. My study moves
away from looking for blanket reasons as to why the decisions of the Justices across the
Supreme Court are made in the manner they are. Rather, the current study examines the
relative decision making patterns among different categories of cases at the Supreme
Court. This alleviates the need to point to political beliefs or the agendas of the Supreme
Court Chief Justice. Instead the decision making patterns of various categories of cases
are compared relative to each other, in an attempt to find specific reasons as to why the
patterns are similar or different. The exercise starts with a description of the types of
cases, and their similarities and differences, which can provide some insight into why
their patterns are the same or different.
Decision Making Studies Focussing on Judicial Attitudes
Early studies of decision making that attempted to link the political ideology and
attitudes of judges to their judicial outcomes include: Schubert (1965),212 Peck (1969),213
Rohde and Spaeth (1976),214 and Segal and Spaeth (1993, 1996, 2002).215 Robertson, and
Segal and Spaeth were particularly adamant in their studies that political attitudes
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Attitudinal Model Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press.

72

represent a complete explanation for the voting behaviour of the Supreme Court Justices,
but recent scholarship has challenged the assertion that political attitudes are the sole
driving force behind judicial voting. For example, Emmett Macfarlane categorizes
decision making studies into three main groups: studies focusing on overt political
appointment process of judges, studies focusing on a tendency for political deference
among judges, including a strong belief in parliamentary supremacy, and studies focusing
on “strong norms of behaviour [that] govern the collegial and collaborative nature of
those institutions and help to determine the relative level of consensus they achieve.”216
It is the third category, the strong norms of behavior at the Supreme Court that
Macfarlane attributes to a high degree of unanimity of the decisions in the court.217
McCormick found that the average rate of unanimous decision making, from 1970
to 2002, was 63 percent. Macfarlane, studying this result, concluded that the high rate of
unanimity was the result of “a natural by-product of the institution’s norms and
processes, rather than as an overt goal of the justices.”218 Of these norms, Macfarlane
states that the Chief Justice has a major impact on the degree of consensus of the Court,
and states that one of Chief Justice McLachlan’s major goals as the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court was to increase the consensus of the Court.219 Such statements try to
move decision making studies into the realm of the absolute – looking for reasons or
phenomena that can explain the nature of the patterns of decisions found. However, the

Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 SCLR (2d)
379 at 380.
217
The degree of unanimity at the Supreme Court was determined by Peter McCormick to be 63.7 percent
between 1970 and 2002, in “Blocs, Swarms, and Outliers: Conceptualizing Disagreement on the Modern
Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) Osgoode Hall LJ Vol 42 Number 1 Article 3, at 107.
218
Supra note 216 at 383.
219
Supra note 216, Macfarlane quoting Cristin Schmitz, “Communication, Consensus Among McLachlin’s
Targets,” (November 19, 1999), 19(27) The Lawyers Weekly.
216

73

current study does not seek an absolute answer as to what underlying principles are
affecting judicial decision making; it seeks to compare the patterns, using the previous
studies as the data for the comparison.
Concurrences at the Supreme Court
Concurring decisions are separate reasons written by a judge or group of judges
who agree with the outcome of a case, but for different reasons than the majority. In a
study of cases from 1984 to 2006, McCormick found that concurrences were a regular
part of the Supreme Court’s decision making process. The incidence of concurring
reasons peaked in 1995 and 1996,220 and then began a slow but steady decline. He
attributed the peak to the high instance of Charter cases before the Supreme Court:
Dynamic period of flux and change has come to an end…[as] most of the major
questions [raised by the Charter] have been answered; as a result, fewer “big”
questions are coming before the Court, and few policy-divergent responses need
to be generated to prepare the field within which these can be managed.221
The average rate of concurring decisions over the entire period was 36 percent.222
McCormick asserts that “divided decisions demonstrate that a court that is both open to a
variety of arguments and willing to change its mind over time.”223
Dissent
Over the period of 1974 to 2003, Joseph studied the solo dissent rates of the
individual Justices,224 as well as the overall rates of solo dissent. She argues that “the

220

Supra note 34 at p 206. There were 75 concurrences in 43 cases in this one year period.
Supra note 34 at p 166. Also cited by Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 75.
222
Supra note 34. This is calculated as the total number of concurrences in the period (610) over the total
number of cases for the same period (1710).
223
Supra note 34 at p 166, citing to MT Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A
Theory of Dissent”, SSRN (1 April 2008), U of Chicago Law & Economics, Online Working Paper No.
363; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 186
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019074
224
Christine Joseph, “All but One: Solo Dissents on the Modern Supreme Court of Canada” (2006) 44
Osgoode Hall LJ 501. The individual rates of solo dissent are included in Table 14, p 518.
221

74

exercise of solo dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada is judicial disagreement at its
apex - a single judge sitting on the highest court in the nation breaking away from his or
her colleagues who have purportedly ‘gotten it wrong.’”225 She found that the overall
rate of dissent rose during this period to 6.3 percent of cases by the end of the study
period.226 She found that the McLachlin Court in 2003 had the highest rate of solo
dissents, but also had the lowest rate of disagreement, at 34 percent, but she could not
extrapolate this data to a relationship between the overall level of disagreement of the
Court and the likelihood of a solo dissent. Joseph’s data showed that the incidence of
solo dissents increases as the panel size moves from five to seven, but decreases as it
moves from seven to nine.
“The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” by Margaret Ann
Wilkinson
Margaret Ann Wilkinson’s chapter, “The Context of the Supreme Court’s
Copyright Cases,”227 in The Copyright Pentalogy, represented the first time decision
making in Supreme Court of Canada copyright cases had been tabulated, and also marked
a departure from the general decision making studies of the past that dealt with general
reasons to explain the pattern of decision making. The objective of her study was to
analyze the most recent eleven Supreme Court of Canada copyright judgments and
compare the decision making pattern in these cases to the pattern of decisions in general
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. Five of the cases were simultaneously released

<https://litigationessentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/p?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&srctype=smi&s
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by the Supreme Court in the summer of 2012, just before Royal Assent of the new
Copyright Modernization Act,228 greatly enlarging the relatively small amount of
Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence. An analysis at this point seemed relevant, as the
decision making pattern may evolve with the modernization of the legislation, so the
current data would serve as a good reference point for future research.
Wilkinson noted a difference in the pattern, which revealed that the nature of
copyright jurisprudence in Canada has been different from the overall pattern of Supreme
Court jurisprudence. Wilkinson suggested that the Supreme Court Justices must have
had some degree of difficulty in deciding these cases, citing that Canada’s existing
copyright law existed before digital music, but had to be applied to modern digital
copyright issues. Wilkinson concluded that the low rate of unanimous decision making
in the study suggests that copyright law is in a more dynamic position, similar to that of
Supreme Court jurisprudence from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, when Charter
cases were flooding the Court docket. In addition, the lack of solo dissents indicated that
copyright law was dynamic and complicated, requiring the members of the Supreme
Court to discuss their viewpoints together and consider policy-based responses to
copyright law questions.229 In other words, the law was too complex for some of the
judges to form their own opinions.
A valid comparison of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case decision
making patterns heard at the Supreme Court to Wilkinson’s work on copyright decisions
can be made. Six patent-related cases heard by the Supreme Court since the early 1990’s
arose from disputes involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
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Regulations,230 which apply to both drug companies and government (Health Canada)
when making decisions about approving generic pharmaceuticals for public use. These
Supreme Court cases originated from applications for judicial review heard at Federal
Court, and so did the copyright cases examined by Professor Wilkinson. Therefore, a
similarity in the decision making pattern between the two sets of cases may provide some
clues that something within the judicial review process itself is problematic.
The complaints filed by the European Communities and their Member States231
with the World Trade Organization about the circumvention of patent rights established
in TRIPS232 by the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is essentially
a complaint about the abbreviated process of judicial review. As such, a determination of
the core issues in these cases at the Supreme Court, whether it be an actual issue over
patent or an administrative law issue related to the judicial review process itself, should
be undertaken so that an accurate characterization of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations can be made for the purposes of assessing the Regulations’
compliance with Canada’s international obligations for intellectual property. Without
evidence that this sidestepping is leading to incorrect judicial outcomes, the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could be viewed as the opposite:
enhancing patent protection by providing a process for evaluating patents over and above
existing patent legislation.
The comparison to Wilkinson’s copyright data will provide insight into this issue,
as these eleven cases also arose following applications for judicial review at the Federal
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Court of Appeal from decisions made by Canada’s Copyright Board. It will help to
characterize the decision making patterns in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases, in an attempt to demonstrate whether they lead to increased
disagreement among the Justices, where such disagreement could translate into
international disagreement over the level of patent protection afforded to pharmaceutical
patent holders in Canada.233

233

As discussed, the comparison of the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases to
the Supreme Court patent cases and general Supreme Court jurisprudence will also help to characterize the
cases. For example, a high degree of unanimity could characterize the cases as easily decided by the
Justices.
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Chapter Six: Data and Analysis
Introduction
Chapters Three and Four provided an overview of patented (innovative)
medicines, generic medicines, the drug approval process in Canada, and the interplay
among health, patent, and administrative law in the approval of generic medicines.
Chapter Four also examined aspects of judicial review, and how they operate within the
context of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations and why they may
be problematic. The highlight of these elements is significant, as the comparison to the
copyright cases in this chapter may re-direct research toward them if similarities in the
decision making patterns of these cases exists.
To answer the three central questions of the thesis, the study in this chapter will
compare the decision making data in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases to the Supreme Court patent cases, to the Supreme Court copyright cases, and to
Supreme Court cases generally. These comparisons will help to characterize the
decisions in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases like one of the existing
study groups, or as its own unique set. This characterization is useful, since a similar
character of patent cases to the copyright cases suggests that future research should focus
on the elements of judicial review and their application to the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations discussed in Chapter Four. A dissimilarity provides
evidence that the use of judicial review in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases is not problematic, in the sense that the judicial review process is not hampering the
evaluation of the patents in question for the purpose of approving generic medicines. If
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the pattern is similar to that of the patent cases or the general Supreme Court cases, this
provides additional support for the conclusion that judicial review is not problematic.
Patent Data
All patent cases between 1970 and 2012 were compiled through an electronic
search on Lexis Nexis. The following Boolean search was conducted: “patent and not
letters patent and not patently and not patent unreasonableness and not Crown patent.”
323 results were achieved, which were divided into 141 Supreme Court of Canada
Judgements and 182 Supreme Court of Canada Rulings on Applications. The 141
judgement results were examined, and eighteen cases that covered an aspect of patent law
in Canada were selected. “Noting up” on these eighteen cases yielded eleven other
Supreme Court of Canada patent cases for a total of 30, which included the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. The Supreme Court cases that primarily deal
with the Patent Act, between 1970 and November, 2014, and the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases, between 1998 and 2015 are in Appendix Two.234 All
motions were excluded. Celgene Corp v Canada (Attorney General)235 was included,
even though the primary issue was the importation of a medicine manufactured outside of
Canada, and the applicability of provisions of the Patent Act, as opposed to a statutory
interpretation issue with the Patent Act or an act of infringement or impeachment, which
would necessarily involve applying the Patent Act.236
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The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations were implemented in 1993, so all cases
heard were after this, making the study period for these cases significantly shorter.
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As one case out of thirty, the inclusion or exclusion of this case has little bearing on the comparisons
drawn to Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.
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From 1970 to the present, there have been thirty patent cases at the Supreme
Court, out of a total of four hundred cases.237 The subset of patent cases chosen is not a
statistical sample – it represents the entire population of patent cases at the Supreme
Court during this period.238 Of these twenty-nine cases, six cases deal specifically with
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. Appendix Two lists all of
the patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases by citation, panel size,
issue, and industry. Appendix Three contains the comprehensive decision making data
for all of the Supreme Court patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases
since 1970. Although there were twenty-nine patent cases overall, two separate
judgments were made in Monsanto ’04 for two distinct questions,239 so Monsanto ’04 is
considered as two separate cases in the data, for a total of thirty.
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Data
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases were extracted from the
overall patent data cases in Appendix Two and are presented separately in Table Two.

The total number of cases in this period is determined by visiting the Supreme Court of Canada’s
judgment website, Judgments at the Supreme Court of Canada, at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scccsc/en/2014/nav_date.do. The total number of cases can be totalled by year over the period of 1970 to
2015.
238
Consideration must be given to what happens to the data if one group of cases is large enough to create a
different pattern of judgements among the remaining cases. In this type of research, the researcher should
re-check the proportions of each decision after removing the category of interest to examine how the
remaining data is affected.
239
The first significant question involved the validity of a patent on a gene for a genetically engineered
variation of canola. The second significant question was whether or not Schmeiser infringed the patent on
the gene for the canola by planting the resulting seeds.
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Table 2: The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases
Case

Panel Drug in
Size
Question
Merck-Frosst
7
Norfloxacin
Canada Inc. v
(brand name:
Canada (Minister
Noroxin)
of National
Health and
Welfare)240
9
Paclitaxel (a
Bristol-Myers
naturally
Squibb v Canada
occurring
(Attorney
substance)
General)241
AstraZeneca
Canada Inc. v
Canada (Minister
of Health)242
Apotex Inc. v
SanofiSynthelabo
Canada Inc.243
Teva Canada Ltd
v Pfizer Canada
Inc.244
Sanofi-Aventis v
Apotex Inc.245

9

Omeprazole
capsules
(brand name:
Losec)

7

Clopidogrel
(brand name:
Plavix)

9

Sildenafil
(brand name:
Viagra)
Ramipril
(brand name:
Altace)

9

Issue
Filing procedure for a
Notice of Allegation;
sublicencing under a
compulsory licencing
regime
Bioequivalence;
Interpretation of
S.5(1.1) is a legal
issue, so standard of
review is correctness
Listing of new patents
for a drug that the
innovator company
withdrew from the
market (Losec)
Novelty and
obviousness: mirror
image of intended
molecule is patentable
Sufficiency of
disclosure of patent;
obviousness; utility

Decision
Unanimous

Majority with
dissent (not
solo)

Unanimous

Unanimous

Unanimous

Unanimous
Damages

The decision making pattern of the patent cases and Patent Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases is summarized from Appendix Three in Table Three. The patent
cases are presented with and without the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases.
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Table 3: Decision Making Patterns in Supreme Court Patent Cases and Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases – As a Percentage of the Total Number of Cases
in each Type

Unanimous
Majority with
concurring reasons
and no dissent
Majority judgments
with no concurring
reasons and at least
one dissent (any
type)
Majority with
concurring reasons
and any dissent
Multiple majority
with dissent
Majority judgments
with unanimous
dissent
Judgments with
non-unanimous
dissent
Judgments with solo
dissents
Total number of
Cases246

Patent Cases
(with PM(NOC)
Cases)
22/30 (73%)
1/30 (3.0%)

Patent Cases
(without
PM(NOC) Cases)
18/24 (75%)
1/24 (4.2%)

PM(NOC) Cases

6/30 (20%)

5/24 (21%)

1/6 (17%)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

6/30 (17%)

5/24 (21%)

1/6 (17%)

1/30 (3.0%)

1/24(4.2%)

0%

1/30 (3.0%)

1/24 (4.2%)

0%

30

24

6

83%
0%

The data demonstrates that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have a
decision making pattern that is very similar to the patent cases overall. In addition, the
removal of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases from the overall patent
data does not significantly affect the pattern in the patent data. This is important, since it
demonstrates that the removal of these cases for analysis preserves the existing data, so

Monsanto ’04 is counted as two cases since there are two separate issues, each with its own set of
judgments.
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that observations about the patent data can be made independently of the extracted data.
For subsequent comparisons, the patent data without the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases will be used.
Overall, there is a high degree of unanimity with very few concurring reasons
with the majority. Dissent was dissected in several ways to help illuminate any patterns
that might exist in the data. Dissent was examined as all types together, unanimous
dissent, non-unanimous dissent (which could include multiple dissents, any of which
could have been written by a solo judge), and solo dissents. Overall, the level of dissent
is small, with one solo dissent in one patent case.
A Qualitative Examination of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Cases
Now that the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases heard at the
Supreme Court of Canada have been isolated, it is pertinent to briefly examine their core
issues. Two of the cases, Merck-Frosst and Astra-Zeneca, involved issues that were
more procedure-oriented than science-oriented. In Merck-Frosst, it was deemed that a
generic company could purchase a raw ingredient from another company that had already
received a Notice of Compliance for that ingredient, and not infringe on the patent. In
this case, Novopharm had acquired a compulsory licence to buy the active ingredient
norfloxacin247 before the compulsory licensing regime was removed from the Patent Act
in 1993. Novopharm could produce norfloxacin tablets for sale in foreign markets, but
the compulsory licence restricted them from selling it in Canada. Apotex began buying
the norfloxacin from Novopharm so it could make its own copy of the antibiotic for sale
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Norfloxacin is an antibiotic. The trade name of Merck-Frosst’s innovative product was Noroxin.
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in the Canadian market. Apotex was seeking a Notice of Compliance for norfloxacin, but
Merck-Frosst applied for an Order of Prohibition under the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, citing that Apotex’s purchase of norfloxacin was a
“sublicence” from Novopharm. Apotex’s argument was that it was not a sublicence from
Novopharm, and it was therefore not infringing on the patent. The judgment is specific
to Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases since compulsory licencing and the
issuance of a Notice of Compliance is specific to drug product approval in Canada, with
its own regulations about the transference of substances from one company to another
that have met the approval criteria.248
The Astra-Zeneca case dealt with the issue of listing new patents on a drug that
Astra-Zeneca had withdrawn from the Canadian market, but the company still wanted to
block the introduction of generics of that withdrawn product. In this case, Astra-Zeneca
was the producer of Losec,249 a drug used to suppress acid production in the
gastrointestinal tract, for the purposes of treating various illnesses where a reduction in
gastric acid production is warranted. Astra-Zeneca’s original product was formulated as
a capsule, but the company had subsequently formulated a tablet of the same drug to be
released on the Canadian market before the expiry of the patents on the original capsule
product, in an attempt to switch consumers to the new product and retain its market share.
After the withdrawal of the omeprazole capsule, Astra-Zeneca listed two new patents for
that product on Health Canada’s Patent Register, in an attempt to block the generic

A secondary issue in this case was whether or not Apotex’s Notice of Allegation was justified, since the
notice was filed on April 19, 1993, but Novopharm’s compulsory licence did not permit it to produce
norfloxacin until July 2, 1993.
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The generic name of the molecule in Losec is omeprazole. Future references to generic pharmaceutical
names will be in parentheses following the trade name of the medicine.
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85

company Apotex from copying the original molecule. However, the patents were never
incorporated into the actual product. The case centered on the issue of whether or not
Apotex was required to file Notices of Allegations as required by section 5(1) of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations for the patents listed when the
drug was approved for sale by Health Canada, or if it had to file Notices of Allegations
for the newer patents listed as well.250 The panel decided unanimously in favour of the
generic applicant, Apotex, stating that Astra-Zeneca was not entitled to list patents on
drugs no longer available to the public. The Justices agreed that section 4(5) of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations required particular patents to be
linked to particular submissions.251 This linkage is unique to the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations and is highlighted in Astra-Zeneca.
The Bristol-Myers case was about the bioequivalence of the same raw ingredient
sourced from two different species of plant – one used by Biolyse and the other used by
Bristol-Myers, who marketed the product first. In Bristol-Myers, the issue was whether
or not Biolyse’s product should be considered a generic since it used the same active
ingredient, paclitaxel, as Bristol-Myer’s product. However, Bristol-Myer’s product had
no patent over paclitaxel, since it is a natural compound contained within a flower. The
case was decided by determining that the scope of section 5(1.1) of the Patented
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Recall from note 2 that the filing of subsequent patents on a drug product that has already been approved
and marketed is called evergreening. It is a strategy employed for the purposes of trying to extend the
patent life of a product. This practice has since been addressed in a new version of the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations, released in 2006. The new regulations in Section 6 impose a “freeze”
on the patent status once the new molecule has achieved a Notice of Compliance.
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Supra note 1, at s 4(5), Section 4(5) states that “Subject to subsection (6), a first person who submits a
patent list must do so at the time the person files the new drug submission or the supplement to a new drug
submission to which the patent list relates.” Therefore, the new patents had to be incorporated into the
product to receive protection under the Regulations.
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Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations was for generic medicine applications
only, and not innovative or unpatentable medicines:
5. (1) If a second person files a submission for a notice of compliance in respect
of a drug and the submission directly or indirectly compares the drug with, or
makes reference to, another drug marketed in Canada under a notice of
compliance issued to a first person and in respect of which a patent list has been
submitted, the second person shall, in the submission, with respect to each patent
on the register in respect of the other drug,
(a) state that the second person accepts that the notice of compliance will not
issue until the patent expires; or
(b) allege that
(i) the statement made by the first person under paragraph 4(4)(d) is
false,
(ii) the patent has expired,
(iii) the patent is not valid, or
(iv) no claim for the medicinal ingredient, no claim for the formulation,
no claim for the dosage form and no claim for the use of the medicinal
ingredient.
Since Biolyse did not rely on any of Bristol-Myer’s data, it was not considered a generic
manufacturer applying to copy and produce a branded product. Therefore, this case is
primarily about the legal interpretation of a provision within the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations – there was never any contention over the issue of
whether or not natural substances were patentable.252 The court also determined that the
appropriate standard of review for determining the scope of section 5(1.1) is correctness,
since it is a purely legal issue. The dissent was in agreement with the majority on the
issue of the standard of review.
A common issue across several industries is the interpretation of section 27(3) of
the Patent Act, which involves sufficiency of disclosure, and the issue also arises when a
pharmaceutical patent holder has not disclosed a patent well enough to allow the generic
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If so, this case would involve issues in both the Regulations and the Patent Act.
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manufacturer to re-create the invention. In Pfizer Canada Inc. v Novopharm Limited,253
Pfizer was seeking an Order of Prohibition through Section 6(1) of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations to block Teva from getting a Notice of
Compliance to create a copy of its erectile dysfunction drug, Viagra (sildenafil). From
this application, Kelen J. evaluated obviousness, utility, and disclosure of Pfizer’s
patents, even though he could not make a ruling of invalidity on the patents, and held that
there was sufficient disclosure by the patent holder. Blais, C.J., Nadon J.A., and Trudel
J.A. reviewed the Federal Court decision and upheld it.254 The issue of sufficiency of
disclosure at the Supreme Court referenced jurisprudence on sufficiency of disclosure in
Section 27(3), including Consolboard, which concludes that sufficiency of disclosure is
met when the invention is adequately described in the claims, as well as what the
invention does.255 Besides Consolboard, Appendix Two lists several patent cases where
sufficiency of disclosure has been an issue, including Burton Parsons, Monsanto ‘79,
Gilcross, and Farbwerke. The ruling on sufficiency of disclosure in this case established
Teva’s allegations under Section Five of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations.256
The Sanofi-Synthelabo case originated when Sanofi-Synthelabo applied for an
Order of Prohibition under Section Six of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations to block the manufacture and sale of a generic copy of its blockbuster
anticoagulant drug, Plavix.257 Apotex challenged the validity of Sanofi-Synthelabo’s
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Pfizer Canada Inc. v Novopharm Limited and the Minister of Health [2009] FC 638.
[2010] FCA, 242.
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[2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60.
256
Specifically, it established its allegations under Section 5(3) and Subsection 5(1)(b)(iii).
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Sanofi-Synthelabo v Apotex Inc. [2005] FC 390. Anticoagulant drugs reduce the ability of the blood to
coagulate or “clot,” which can reduce the risks of subsequent heart attack, stroke, and embolism when
certain medical conditions arise. The generic name of Plavix is clopidogrel.
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patents on Plavix, since the chemical, when synthesized, was a mirror image of another
molecule that Sanofi-Synthelabo had intentionally tried to develop (the genus patent).
Since Sanofi had patented the intentioned molecule, Apotex claimed that the
unintentioned “mirror-image” of that molecule, Plavix, was not patentable for two
reasons: it was prior art, and it could be anticipated from the genus patent. The court
upheld the patent on the “accidental” molecule, since a person skilled in the art of drug
development would not have anticipated how to isolate the new substance, nor anticipate
what it would be used for. The Federal Court of Appeal reviewed and upheld the
decision258 before it reached the Supreme Court and was subsequently dismissed. The
issue of genus and species patents has been addressed by other Supreme Court cases, and
so has the issue of anticipation. Therefore, the issues in Sanofi-Synthelabo are not unique
to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. The Supreme Court dealt
with the genus/species patent issue in C.H. Boehringer Sohn v Bell-Craig Limited,259
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v Gilbert and Company,260 and Monsanto Company v
Commissioner of Patents.261
The Sanofi-Aventis case was a question of Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations section eight damages. Section eight is a compensation
mechanism for generic manufacturers to receive payments if an innovator’s Order of
Prohibition is discontinued or dismissed by the court. The case addressed the issue of the
point when damages are deemed to begin, called the “hypothetical start date,” as well as
the market share the generic company would have had if the generic approval had not
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Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo [2006] FCA 421.
[1963] SCR 410.
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[1996] SCR 189.
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[1979] 2 SCR 1108.
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been delayed by the opposition of the innovator. 262 The case was dismissed, with no
reasons provided, suggesting agreement with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal.
In summary, four of the cases, Merck-Frosst, Astra-Zeneca, Bristol-Myers, and
Sanofi-Aventis primarily involve the Regulations themselves, while two of the cases,
Sanofi-Synthelabo and Teva, primarily involve patent disputes that were adjudicated
through the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. It is therefore not
surprising that the pattern of decision making in these cases would be similar to the
overall pattern of decision making in the patent cases.263

262
263

[1982] 1 SCR 907.
That similarity was demonstrated in Table Two on page 42.
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Table 4: Primary Issues in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases
Case

Issue

Filing procedure for a
Merck-Frosst Canada
Notice of Allegation;
Inc. v Canada
sublicencing under a
(Minister of National
compulsory licencing
Health and Welfare)264
regime
Bioequivalence;
Bristol-Myers Squibb v
Interpretation of S.5(1.1) is
Canada (Attorney
a legal issue, so standard of
General)265
review is correctness
Listing of new patents for a
AstraZeneca Canada
drug that the innovator
Inc. v Canada
company withdrew from
(Minister of Health)266
the market (Losec)
Apotex Inc. v SanofiNovelty and obviousness:
Synthelabo Canada
mirror image of intended
267
Inc.
molecule is patentable
Teva Canada Ltd v
Sufficiency of disclosure of
268
Pfizer Canada Inc.
patent; obviousness; utility
Sanofi-Aventis v
Damages
Apotex Inc.269

264

[1998] 2 SCR 193, 1998 SCJ 58 [Merck-Frosst].
[2005] 1 SCR 533, [2005] SCJ 26 [Bristol-Myers].
266
[2006] 2 SCR 560, 2006 SCC 49 [Astra-Zeneca].
267
[2008] 3 SCR 265, [2008] SCJ 63 [Sanofi-Synthelabo].
268
[2012] 3 SCR 625, 2012 SCC 60 [Teva].
269
[2015] SCC 20 [Sanofi-Aventis].
265

Primarily PM(NOC)
or Patent?
PM(NOC) Regulations

PM(NOC) Regulations

PM(NOC) Regulations

Patent Act

Patent Act
PM(NOC) Regulations
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The Composition of the Court
Figure Two describes the composition of the court in deciding Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.
Figure 2: The Composition of the Court in Deciding Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Cases

Unanimous Decision
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Lamer was the Chief Justice for one of the six cases, Merck-Frosst, but did not sit on that
case. McLachlin has been the chief justice for the other five, and has sat on four of those
five cases. It is unclear if this high level of consistency of the Chief Justice has
contributed to the high level of unanimity in the case, but could be a subject of future
study.
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Three of the decisions were panels of seven, and three were panels of nine. Of the
three panels of nine, one decision, Bristol-Myers, was an issue of the scope of section
5(1.1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. Another, AstraZeneca, was about listing patents for a drug that had been removed from the Canadian
market, and involved the proper interpretation of section 4(5). The third, Sanofi-Aventis,
was a dismissed appeal on section eight damages, with no reasons given, just agreement
with the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. Interestingly, Teva and SanofiSynthelabo, both cases primarily about the validity of the patents for the purposes of
approving a generic, were panels of seven, which suggests that the Supreme Court does
not see the cases as of primary importance among all of the cases that it hears.
There is a high degree of consistency in the composition of the panels, since all
six cases have been heard within a seventeen-year period. Excepting Merck ’98, the
remaining cases span only ten years. McLachlin C.J., Abella J., Deschamps J., and Lebel
J. have sat on the most cases, each sitting on four. Of these four justices, Abella J.,
Deschamps, J., and Lebel J. all participated in the same three cases, and voted together in
all.
It was not until Sanofi-Aventis was there a significant change in the Justices
participating in the cases. Sanofi-Aventis saw the addition of Justices Gascon, Côté, and
Wagner, with the retirement of Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and Sopinka. The
three new Justices participated with the others in a unanimous decision to dismiss the
case.
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Binnie J. has written two of the five majority judgments, while Lebel J., Rothstein
J., and Iacobucci J. have each written one judgment for the majority.270 The one
dissenting judgment was written by Bastarache J., with Major J. and Iacobucci J.
agreeing with the dissent. McLachlin J. has been a Supreme Court Justice during all six
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, and has participated in four, but has
never written the majority judgment. Therefore, the Justices have not deferred the
judgment to one “expert” Justice in this field, which may have been the case if the
decisions were too technical to adjudicate.
Copyright Data
The Wilkinson study in “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases”
included the five pentalogy cases released in the summer of 2012, plus the six most
recent cases prior to them. All of the cases dealt with the same (older) version of the
Copyright Act.271 One additional non-copyright case with relevant links to copyright
decisions was included.272
Appendix Five highlights the issues and the decisions in the eleven copyright
cases. This decision making pattern data is summarized in Table Four, and is compared
to the patent cases and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.
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As mentioned, Sanofi-Aventis was written without reasons, upholding the Federal Court of Appeal
decision and referring to its reasons.
271
Copyright Act RSC 1985.
272
Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 <http://scc.lexum.org/decisiascc-csc/scc-csc/scccsc/en/item/7963/index.do> [Crookes].
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Table 5: Decision Making Patterns in the Copyright Cases, PM(NOC) Cases, and the
Patent Cases: Instances of Judgments273

Unanimous
Majority with concurring
reasons but no minority
dissent
Majority with or without
concurring reasons and at
least one dissent (any type)
Majority with no concurring
reasons and dissent
Majority with Concurring
Reasons and Dissent
Multiple majority with
Dissent
Majority judgments with
unanimous dissent
Judgments with nonunanimous dissent
Judgments with solo dissents
Total number of Cases

Copyright
Pentalogy Cases
3/11 (27%)
3/11 (27%)

PM(NOC) Cases
5/6 (83%)
0%

Patent Cases
1970 - 2012274
18/24 (75%)
1/24 (4.2%)

5/11 (45%)

1/6 (17%)

6/24 (25%)

4/11 (36%)

1/6 (17%)

5/24 (21%)

1/11 (9%)

0%

0%

2/11 (18%)

0%

0%

5/11 (45%)

1/6 (17%)

5/24 (21%)

0%

0%

1/24 (4.2%)

0%
11

0%
6

1/24 (4.2%)
24

Overall, the pattern of decision making is much different in the copyright cases. The
level of unanimity is threefold higher in the patent cases as well as the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. The level of majority cases with dissent is more
than twice as high in the copyright cases than the patent cases and the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, which characterizes the patent cases and the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as demonstrating a high level of
unanimity, with little dissent. The copyright cases are at the opposite end of the
spectrum, where most of the decisions are majority decisions accompanied by dissent.

The copyright data was extracted from Professor Wilkinson’s article, supra note 18, Figure 2, page 82.
Additional data was taken from various places in Section B, “The Decisions,” pages 76 to 83.
274
The patent cases data used exclude the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as discussed.
273
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Concurring reasons play little part in the patent decisions, and no part in the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) decisions. The level of concurrence in the
copyright cases is more significant, where twenty-seven percent of the copyright cases
have a majority with concurring reasons but no minority dissent, and another nine percent
of the cases have concurring reasons with dissent, for a total of thirty-six percent as
concurring decisions.
The presence of a majority with concurring reasons and dissent is low among all
categories, including copyright. The presence of solo dissents across all of the cases is
also low, with only one solo dissent written across all forty-one cases, which was a patent
case, adjudicated through the Patent Act.
The three comparator groups were also examined by number and type of decision,
with the results presented in Table Five.
Table 6: Number of Reasons Given in each Group of Cases

Majority (includes
unanimous)
Concurring
Dissenting
Number of Cases
Total number of
reasons
Reasons/Case

Copyright
Pentalogy275
13 (59%)

PM(NOC) Cases

Patent Cases

6 (86%)

25 (81%)

7 (29%)
5 (21%)
11
24

0
1 (17%)
6
7

1 (3%)
7 (23%)
24
33

2.2

1.2

1.4

The case data are broken down in this fashion to confirm, reject, or provide support for
any possible inferences from the overall judgment data by case, as in Table Four. The
higher percentage of majority reasons in the patent cases is strongly reflective of the
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Supra note 18 at 82, Figure 2. The values were derived from this Figure, as well as from various
references in the text of the article.
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higher level of unanimity in the patent cases and the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases. The patent cases have many fewer cases with dissent judgments than
copyright cases, but the overall percentage of dissenting reasons given for patent cases,
approximates the copyright data. Therefore, when dissent does exist in the patent cases,
it indicates that there is a significant amount of disagreement among the Justices.
Overall, however, there is still one more reason (of any type) in an average
copyright case than in an average Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case, and
nearly the same ratio for the patent cases in comparison to the copyright cases. Fewer
reasons being written in the patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases
may be related to the number of issues per case, since most of the patent and Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases in the study, on a general level, have one issue to
be decided per case.276 Wilkinson did not comment on the number of issues per case in
her article, but Wilkinson does state that the issues in the three copyright cases with
unanimous dissents range from “more straightforward to extremely complex,”277 further
differentiating them from the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. Fewer
reasons overall also suggests that cases involving the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations do not create significant disagreement over their interpretation
among the Justices.
Supreme Court Decision Making Data
Wilkinson’s article referenced several articles that dealt with decision making
patterns at the Supreme Court of Canada. Those articles were sourced and referenced

Recall that Monsanto ’04 had two distinct questions to be adjudicated. Gilcross had multiple issues, but
they arose under one central question for the Supreme Court to decide through the Patent Act.
277
Supra note 18 at 83.
276
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directly. The decision making data on the Supreme Court was compiled from this data
for comparison to the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and the patent
cases.
Research undertaken by Peter McCormick concluded that the rate of unanimity
among Supreme Court decisions is approximately 63 percent.278 McCormick’s study
period started at the beginning of 1970 and extended to the end of 2002, covering 3,326
decisions in total. However, the rate of unanimity across this period was highly variable,
ranging from a low of 43.4 percent in 1995279 to a high of 90.2 percent in 1980.280 The
peak in unanimity occurred in 1980, just prior to the signing of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982, and decreased steadily as Charter challenges at the Supreme Court
grew in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Concurring decisions peaked in 1995, and have declined
ever since, correlating highly with the ensuing decline in Charter cases. Therefore,
McCormick’s “average” rate of unanimity has been calculated across a large range of
values.
The 2004 to 2014 statistics on the Supreme Court of Canada’s website present a
more time-period relevant rate of unanimity for comparison,281, 282 where the average rate
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Supra note 210 at 106.
Ibid at 107.
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Ibid. The incidence of non-unanimity was reached in 1980, at eleven cases. The total number of
judgments by the Supreme Court that year is found by visiting the historical judgments page on the
Supreme Court of Canada website at http://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/nav_date.do
281
Supreme Court of Canada Statistics, 2004, 2014. Statistics on the Supreme Court of Canada’s
disposition rate are found on the Supreme Court of Canada website at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case dossier/stat/cat4-eng.aspx. The time period is more relevant since the Supreme Court heard four of the six
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases between 2004 and 2014.
282
Supreme Court cases arrive at the court from three sources. If a party wishes to appeal the decision of
another court, a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court can decide if leave to appeal will be granted to
hear the case. The criteria for hearing a case are based on the importance of the issue at hand to the public,
or if the case raises an important issue of law. Federal references require the Supreme Court to give an
opinion on the questions referred to the Court by the Governor in Council, and are considered appeals as of
right, as they are automatically approved to be heard. Certain serious criminal cases are also appeals as of
right and must be heard by the Court. Of the 831 cases between 2004 and 2014, 170 (approximately twenty
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of unanimity was 73 percent. The period is more relevant, since Charter cases are not
comprising as high of a proportion of the cases heard as in the period covered by
McCormick. The results are collated in Table Six, where the ratio of unanimous cases to
the total caseload was totalled from the data, then compared to the copyright, patent, and
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) data.
Table 7: Split/Unanimous Judgments: A Comparison to the Copyright Pentalogy and the
Supreme Court of Canada Generally

Split
Unanimous
Total
Split/Total
Unanimous/Total

Copyright283

PM(NOC)

Patent

8
3
11
73%
27%

1
5
6
17%
83%

4
21
25
16%
84%

Supreme
Court
226
600
826
27%
73%

The data show similar splits in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) and patent
cases with the Supreme Court generally, but all three vary significantly from the
copyright cases. The data is supportive of the previous findings on the high level of
unanimity in patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases earlier in this
chapter.
During the period of 2004 to 2014, the Supreme Court heard four of the six
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, where three of the four cases were
unanimous. Over the time span of all of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)

percent) cases heard were appeals as of right. Because twenty percent of the cases are appeals as of right,
future research could involve revamping the data to remove the appeals as of right, to see if the pattern is
different. If a significant portion of the appeals as of right are questions of criminal law, they may be
imparting more disagreement into the decision making pattern. Comparing the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) cases to Supreme Court cases that were only granted leave to appeal may prove to represent
a more valid comparison.
283
Supra note 18 at 82. The copyright data on split and unanimous decisions was calculated from Figure
Two on page 82 of the Wilkinson article.
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cases, 1998 to 2015, the average rate of unanimity climbed above both Supreme Court
unanimity average calculations to 83 percent. However, there are few Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases, making the average highly sensitive to change the addition of one more case would move that average by one-seventh, or fourteen
percent.284 Caution should be used in drawing any comparisons of the rate of unanimity
of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases to the general level of Supreme
Court unanimity, other than to state that they both have similarly high rates of unanimity.
To state that the rate of unanimity is higher in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases may be premature until several more cases have been heard.
Based on 1,716 Supreme Court judgments between 1984 and 2006, McCormick
states that the general rate of concurring reasons written is 36 percent.285 This is much
higher than having no concurring reasons among the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases and the three percent for the patent cases. Having no concurring
reasons in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is inconsistent with
McCormick’s finding that “separate concurrences are a regular and ongoing aspect of the
work [of the Supreme Court].”286
Case Disposition
The general Supreme Court disposition rate was calculated from the Supreme
Court’s published statistics, for the period 2004 to 2014.287 The overall disposition rate
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Since there are currently six cases, each case impacts the average by one-sixth. If the case load grew to
seven, each case would impact the average by one-seventh.
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Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 83, quoting Peter McCormick, which can be referenced in note 130 at Table
1, page 144. There were 906 signatures on the 610 concurring reasons, among the 1716 reasons given
during this period. The figure of 36 percent is achieved by dividing 610 by 1716 and converting to a
percent.
286
McCormick, supra note 34 at 163.
287
See “ Supreme Court Statistics 2004 to 2014,” http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/stat/indexeng.aspx
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for the period was calculated to be 47 percent. The disposition rate, for the purposes of
this paper, is the proportion of appeal cases allowed by the Supreme Court, expressed as
a percentage of the total number of that type of case.
Since four of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases were heard
between 2005 and 2014, that reference data on case disposition is timely and relevant.
However, the small number of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases makes
the disposition data highly sensitive - a change in the disposition of one case would affect
the result by one in seven, or fourteen percent. However, comparing the overall
disposition rate to the patent data together provides some insight, since thirty patent cases
were in the study period.288 If the pattern in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases is very close to the Supreme Court patent cases, then examining the
disposition rate may provide some guidance as to future disposition rates for the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.
Table Seven provides the disposition of the Supreme Court patent and Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. Table Eight summarizes the data in Table
Seven and compares the disposition rate to Supreme Court cases between 2004 and 2014.

288

Recall that the two Monsanto decisions in one case from 2004 rendered two separate decisions.
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Table 8: Supreme Court of Canada Disposition on Patent Cases and Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases: Appeal Allowed or Dismissed289
Case Name
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v Ford Motor Co. of Canada
Lacal Industries Ltd. v Slater Steel Industries Ltd.
General Foods Ltd. v Struthers Scientific and International
Corp.
Merck & Co. v S. & U. Chemicals Ltd.
Tennessee Eastman Co., a division of Eastman Kodak Co. v
Canada
Gilcross Ltd. v Sandoz Patents Ltd.
Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v Hewlett Packard (Canada) Ltd.
Dairy Foods Inc. v Co-operative Agricole de Granby
Eli Lilly & Co. v S & U Chemicals Ltd.
Farbwerke Hoechst AG Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v
Halocarbon (Ontario) Ltd.
Monsanto Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1979)
Consolboard Inc. v MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd.
Eli Lilly & Co. v Novopharm Ltd; Eli Lilly & Co. v Apotex Inc.
Armstrong Cork Canada v Domco Industries Ltd.
Shell Oil Co. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)
Pioneer Hi Bred Ltd. v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)
Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v Apotex Inc.
Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National
Health and Welfare) (1998, PM(NOC))
Whirlpool Corp. v Camco Inc.
Whirlpool Corp. v Maytag Inc.
Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents)
Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd.
Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser (2004, first issue)
Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser (2004, second issue)
Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (PM(NOC)
Astra Zeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (PM(NOC))
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo (PM(NOC))
Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General)
Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. PM(NOC)
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc. (PM(NOC))

289

Appeal Allowed
or Dismissed
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Allowed. Cross
appeal dismissed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Allowed.
Allowed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Allowed
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Allowed (in part).
Dismissed (in
part).
Allowed.
Allowed.
Dismissed.
Dismissed.
Allowed.
Dismissed

Refer to Appendix Two for full citations for the patent cases. Cases in bold represent cases that arose to
the Supreme Court after a Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) challenge.
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Table 9: Summary of Patent and Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case
Dispositions

Total Cases291
Allowed
Dismissed
Disposition Rate
(Percent of
allowed cases of
total)

Patent Cases
(with
PM(NOC)
Cases
30
13
17
43%

Patent Cases
(without
PM(NOC)
cases
24
11
13
45%

PM(NOC)
cases

General
Supreme
Court290

6
4
2
67%

822
386
436
47%

The patent cases have a similar rate of allowed appeals as the Supreme Court generally,
but the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have a slightly higher rate.
Because the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are highly sensitive to
changes in data, where the addition of one more case would change the disposition rate
by fourteen percent, it is difficult to conclude that these cases have a higher overall
disposition rate than the patent cases, or the Supreme Court cases generally. If that
conclusion could be made, it could point to errors in interpretation of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations at the Federal Court or Federal Court of
Appeal, in which case research could begin by identifying, categorizing, and studying the
errors.
Solo Dissent
Joseph’s study shows that the percentage of solo dissents written for cases
primarily about private law has steadily decreased from 55 percent in the Laskin court to

290

Supra note 287.
Recall that Monsanto is counted as two cases, for a total of 30 cases. Gilcross is counted as one case
that was allowed. Alternatively, it could be counted as one allowed appeal and one dismissed appeal but
the overall result is not changed significantly.
291
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ten percent in the McLachlin C.J. court.292 This suggests that the Supreme Court Justices
are generally not at odds with each other with respect to cases involving private litigants.
Seeing that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases involve the Attorney
General as a litigant (representing Health Canada), but are essentially private disputes
between pharmaceutical companies, the lack of solo dissents across all of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases seems consistent with the low incidence of
dissent in private cases in the McLachlin C.J. court.
Joseph also found that the solo dissent rate, as a percentage of all of the Supreme
Court cases in the study, was steadily increasing, to a maximum of 6.3 percent in the
McLachlin C.J. court, differing from the four percent rate of solo dissent in the patent
cases and its non-existence in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases.293
The solo dissent rates for Justices studied by Joseph who have sat on the Supreme Court
since the first Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases in 1998 is set forth in
Table Nine.294 The percentage of solo dissents across the study categories is in Table Ten.

292

Supra note 224 at 511, Table 7. Under the McLachlin C.J. court, sixty percent of solo dissents are
written for criminal cases, and thirty percent are written for public cases.
293
Refer to Table Two on page 81.
294
Adapted from a similar table created by Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Supra note 18 at 80. The
original data was extracted from Joseph, Supra note 182 at 511, Table 7. Justices Abella, Charron,
Cromwell, Rothstein, Karakatsanis, Gascon, and Moldaver are not included in Joseph’s data.
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Table 10: Solo dissent rates for Justices sitting in 2002 or appointed by the end of 2003
Justice (all sat on the
Court for various
PM(NOC) cases)
Major
Arbour
L’Heureux-Dubé
Bastarache
McLachlin
LeBel
Iacobucci
Gonthier
Deschamps
Cory
Binnie
Fish

Frequency of Solo
Dissent Reported by
Joseph (up to and
including 2003)
More than average
More than average
More than average
More than average
Average
Average
Less than average
Less than average
Less than average
Less than average
Never
Never

Number of
PM(NOC) cases
heard

Dissent

2
0
1
3
4
4
1
1
4
1
3
3

1 (not solo)
N/A
No
1 (not solo)
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Table 11: Percent of Solo Dissents of the Copyright, PM(NOC), and Patent Caseloads

Solo Dissents
Total Caseload
Percentage of Solo
Dissents

Copyright Cases
0
11
0%

PM(NOC) Cases
0
6
0%

Patent Cases
1
30
3%

There is a complete lack of solo dissents in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases; with the small number of cases, it would not be prudent to distinguish
them from the Supreme Court data generally. The lone case with any type of dissent was
Bristol-Myers, an issue of statutory interpretation under section 5(1) of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, where three dissenting judges felt that
Biolyse should have been treated like a generic company applying to copy an innovative
medicine. If this was the case, the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations would apply, and the Biolyse product would be treated as a generic
medicine. The majority, however, found that Biolyse was an innovator, and that the
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Regulations did not apply to Biolyse’s product. If section 5(1) was found to apply, the
contentious issue of patenting natural substances would have also arisen, which would
also involve the element of patentable subject matter, and not the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations. With the level of dissent being so low, it is not
surprising that the two Justices that have a higher frequency of solo dissent generally are
the only ones that took part in the sole case with a dissent.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the decision making pattern of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and compare it to the pattern in the
Supreme Court patent cases, the Supreme Court copyright cases in Wilkinson’s study,
and the pattern in general Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Comparing the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases to the Supreme
Court Copyright Cases
With respect to the copyright cases, a similar pattern of decision making could
indicate that the Justices were having similar issues with both types of cases. Since their
commonality is the fact that they were all cases that arose following a judicial review at
the Federal Court, a similar decision making pattern could point to problems with the
judicial review process for these types of cases, providing guidance for future research.
Areas of concern with employing judicial review for the generic approval cases include
the reversed burden of proof and the standard of review of reasonableness. In addition,
judicial review can only answer one question, and the process is therefore limited to
answering whether or not Health Canada acted reasonably when it added patents to its
Patent Register, so the process constrains the judge from determining the validity of the
patents in question. Other potential problems include proceeding summarily (which
disallows the examination of live witnesses), and lacking an effective appeal process for
the patent holder. A dissimilar pattern between the two case groups suggests that the
process of judicial review is not problematic, as asserted by the European Union Member
States in their complaint.
The decision making pattern in the copyright cases is significantly different from
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. The rate of unanimous decisions
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is 27 percent, compared to 83 percent in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases, and the rate of concurrence is 36 percent, compared to zero percent in the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. With a three-fold higher rate of unanimity,
combined with no concurring opinions (with and without dissent), there appears to be
much less divided opinion on matters related to the regulatory approval of generic drugs
in Canada than to copyright.
The copyright cases also exhibit a rate of dissent that is almost double that of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. If Wilkinson’s conclusion is correct,
that copyright law is “in a dynamic period of flux and change,”295 “‘big’ questions are
coming before the Court,”296 and “policy-divergent responses would appear to need to be
generated to prepare the field within which these can be managed,”297 then the
regulations linking patent and approval of generic pharmaceuticals are not. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases generate an average of 1.2 written reasons per case, while the copyright cases
generate 2.2 reasons per case.
A comparison of decision making patterns in Supreme Court Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases with Wilkinson’s Supreme Court copyright cases does not
support the conclusion that the two sets of cases are adjudicated with a similar underlying
problem that could be related to judicial review in the lower courts. The primary cases in
both sets were adjudicated by judicial review, but the study does not corroborate the view
that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases are problematic because of
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Wilkinson, supra note 18 at 84, citing McCormick, supra note 206 at 166.
Ibid.
297
Ibid.
296
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judicial review. This is supported by a qualitative analysis of the six Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases, of which four dealt with cases specific to those
regulations. And, of those four, none pointed to issues with the process of judicial
review itself, or suggested that judicial review was causing a problem. The other two
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases dealt specifically with patent issues,
where one appeal was allowed and the other was dismissed. A subsequent study of
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal cases would provide additional evidence on
the issue of judicial review, but comparative data on decision making patterns at the level
of the Federal Court does not exist in the literature. A general database of decision
making would have to be built before any comparisons could be made. Qualitative
studies on subsets of these cases would be a mode of analysis that may be more realistic.
Comparing Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case Data to Supreme
Court Patent Case Data
To complement this comparative analysis, the decision making pattern in the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases was also compared to the Supreme
Court patent cases from 1970 to 2014. In the event that the pattern was not found to be
similar to that of the copyright cases, the pattern may be similar the patent subset of
Supreme Court cases.
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case decision making pattern is
almost identical to the patent case pattern, so this comparison provides no evidence of
excessive disagreement in adjudicating the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases, and it does suggest that the cases are adjudicated similarly to the patent cases,
despite the difference in the adjudication process. Two of the six Patented Medicines
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(Notice of Compliance) cases directly involved issues requiring interpretation of the
Patent Act, which supports this conclusion.
Eighty-three percent (five out of six) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases were decided unanimously, only slightly higher than the 75 percent
rate found in the Supreme Court patent cases generally. In addition, the number of
majority judgments with concurring reasons was very low in both – four percent in the
patent cases, and zero in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. There
were similar low levels of unanimous dissent in both, at 17 percent (one out of six cases)
for the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases and 21 percent (five out of
twenty-four) for the patent cases. The patent cases had five out of thirty cases (17
percent) with unanimous dissent, while the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases had one out of six (17 percent). The similar pattern of decision making is not
surprising, given that two of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases
dealt with issues requiring interpretation of the Patent Act,298 and the other four deal with
the interpretation of a piece of legislation that is essentially outlines a procedure for
getting generic approval.
Comparing Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Case Data to Supreme
Court Data
Both the Supreme Court cases overall, and the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases have a high rate of unanimous decision making, with the Supreme
Court at 73 percent and the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at 83
percent. Applying Songer and Siripurapu’s conclusions, this suggests that there would be

298

Teva and Sanofi-Synthelabo.
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fewer issues per Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case than the Supreme Court
generally. Given that one or two issues per case were identified, this seems plausible
when considering the breadth of cases that the Supreme Court hears. In contrast to the
low rates of unanimity in the Charter of Rights and Freedom cases from the mid-eighties
to the mid-nineties, the high rate of unanimity in Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) cases signals little flux or uncertainty with respect to the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations. This is supported by a much lower level
of concurrence as well.
Dissent – Comparing Supreme Court Jurisprudence to the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Cases
The lone Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) case with a dissent was
Bristol-Myers. The dissent was written by Bastarache J., with Major J. in agreement.
According to Joseph, both Major J. and Bastarache J. write solo dissenting opinions at a
higher than average rate than their colleagues. Given the small number of cases, it is not
surprising that there are no solo dissents, but the presence of some dissent, unanimous
dissent in this case, written by higher-than-average dissenters (across all of the cases they
judged), suggests that the rate of general dissent is similar to Supreme Court
jurisprudence overall. With an overall low rate of dissent, it is difficult to conclude that
the Justices have significant disagreement when adjudicating the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases, regardless of how the process was adjudicated in the lower
court.
The Composition of the Court in the Cases
There has been a high degree of consistency in the composition of the court in
deciding the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases. The same four Justices
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have sat on four of the six cases. Of the four, three have sat on the same three cases and
voted together on all. Binnie J. wrote two of the judgments, while the remaining four
were written by different Justices, indicating that the issues in the cases can be managed
by most Justices, not necessarily requiring a scientific background. The implications of
the consistency of the court on the decision making pattern itself will be borne out as
more cases are heard at the Supreme Court – there are presently too few cases to make
any conclusions about the effect of the composition of the court.
Disposition Rates
Overall, four cases were overturned at the Supreme Court, while two were
dismissed. Of the four allowed, two were about patent issues (Merck ’98 and Teva), and
two were primarily about Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations issues
(Bristol-Myers and Astra-Zeneca). Of the dismissed cases, one was primarily about
patent (Sanofi-Synthelabo) and one was about the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations (Sanofi-Aventis). The disposition rate for the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases is higher than the disposition rate for the
Supreme Court overall. With this small data set, it is difficult to conclude that the
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have difficulty with the interpretation or
application of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations because of the
judicial review process, but it does provide direction for future study into the issue. A
suitable investigation into the cases where appeals were allowed may reveal a common
element, and whether or not it is related to the process of judicial review. The high
overturn rate also suggests that the Federal Court of Appeal’s treatment of the Federal
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Court’s decisions in Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases requires
investigation.
Private Law and the Supreme Court
The small number of Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases overall is
indicative that there are few significant problems of national concern with the
adjudication of these cases, since only six cases have risen to the Supreme Court since the
Regulations came into effect in 1993. Since the cases are primarily private economic law
cases, it could be postulated that the Supreme Court justices choose not to hear the cases,
and give little weight to these private matters when they do hear them. However, the
current study does indicate that the Supreme Court Justices do not treat all private
economic law cases the same. The different decision making pattern between the
copyright cases, which are also private economic law, and the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) cases indicates that the different realms of law are treated
accordingly, and private economic law is not “blanketed” with any judicial policy. Three
of the six Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases have been decided by a panel
of nine, and all three of those cases required interpreting the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations, suggesting that the Supreme Court may view issues in the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases as important to Canadians as other
types of unrelated cases.
Although both sets of cases are considered matters of private law, both have
aspects that are relevant to all Canadians, and an examination into those aspects may
reveal additional information about the decision making results.
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Is Judicial Review Contributing to Injustice in the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Cases?
The analysis does not provide support for the assertion that the judicial review
component of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations provides an
avenue for creating disagreement that could lead to the incorrect adjudication in generic
drug approval cases. Even though the process is short of a full trial, the study does not
indicate that the Justices cannot incorporate aspects of health law, administration law, and
patent law to properly adjudicate the cases at the federal level. This is also supported by
the decision making pattern in the cases, which is nearly identical with the pattern for
Supreme Court patent cases adjudicated since 1970.
If the high degree of unanimity in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases is indicative of what it stands for on its face – that high unanimity equates to less
disagreement because of certainty in the interpretation, application, and issues before the
law, then the results suggest that the Regulations present little difficulty for the justices in
their current form. This suggests that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases have, for the most part, a correct answer, or, at least, an answer that can be
adjudicated without extreme difficulty. The Justices exhibit a different pattern of
decision making in the copyright cases, which are also private economic rights cases,
which lends credence to the idea that the Justices are flexing their judicial muscle on a
case-by-case basis, and not following a policy of overtly choosing unanimity.
Because the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations involve
three aspects of law – administrative, health, and patent law - any adaptation of the
Regulations requires examining which of these aspects is problematic before meaningful
changes can be made to the Regulations. This study indicates that the judicial review

114

process is not problematic, and therefore does not suggest that there are any issues
associated with a process that only answers one question, nor the fact that it proceeds
summarily. Neither does it elucidate any issues with the burden of proof, the standard of
review, nor the appeal rights of the litigants. Judicial review appears to be suitable for
this process, especially when one considers the fact that the assessment of any patents for
the purpose of approving generics is performed in the context of the uses approved by
Health Canada only.
Future Research
Further Study at the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal
Additional support for the conclusion that judicial review is not contributing to
injustice in the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases could be achieved by
qualitatively examining the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, where the cases will involve significantly
more mixed questions of law and fact.
A quantitative examination of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
cases at the Federal Court, similar to the examination of the decision making pattern of
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) cases at the Supreme Court could also be
undertaken, but there are significantly more cases to study, and the actual number of
cases is difficult to quantify. As mentioned, Sanofi-Aventis, the inventor of the
hypertension drug Altace (ramipril), filed three suits in Federal Court to block the
genericization of the medicine by three separate manufacturers, even though they had
already lost an initial challenge from generic medicine producer, Apotex. An even bigger
example, the litigation between Astra-Zeneca and Apotex over the blockbuster
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gastroesophogeal reflux drug Losec (omeprazole) lasted seventeen years.299 Apotex filed
twelve separate Notices of Allegation against various Losec patents, which resulted in
fifty-five decisions by the Federal Court and fifteen decisions by the Federal Court of
Appeal (and one at the Supreme Court, as discussed).300 Conservatively, if fifty
medicines have lost patent status since the inception of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations in 1994, then there are potentially thousands of cases to
examine. An initial study to determine how many drugs have lost patent status since
1994 is an initial step.
Data Exclusivity

Data exclusivity is another current issue that involves Division Eight of Canada’s
Food Drug Regulations301 and section 5(5) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations. Data exclusivity refers to the period of time where an
innovator of a new pharmaceutical that has been issued a Notice of Compliance can
protect their data from generic manufacturers who wish to copy the medicine. Currently,
data exclusivity is eight years from the date the Notice of Compliance was granted, but a
generic manufacturer can apply for access to the data within six years from the date of the
Notice of Compliance. Canada rejected the European Union’s proposal to extend data
protection by an additional two years302 in negotiations leading to the Canada-European
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Supra note 105 at 12.
Ibid.
301
Supra note 56 at C.08.004.1.
302
Supra note 110. The European Union also negotiated successfully to extend patent term by the amount
of time equal to the difference between the filing date for a Notice of Compliance and the date the Notice
of Compliance is granted. This extends patent life by over two years, and if the data exclusivity provisions
were applied, the total time extension is estimated by Grootenorst and Hollis to be approximately five
years.
300

116

Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement.303 With additional proposals by the
European Union to extend the basic patent term, acceptance of all of the proposals could
have added five and a half years of market monopoly.304 Extending data protection
means that data exclusivity could have become another lever for extending patent term
since it shortens the amount of time that a generic manufacturer has for developing the
product which may mean that the generic version will not be ready by the time the
relevant patents have expired. In addition, drugs that have lost patent protection may
benefit from the additional exclusivity period and prevent manufacturers from copying
the product, even though they have no patent protection. This push by the European
Union did not consider the additional protection afforded to patent holders through the
twenty-four month automatic stay in Section 6 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations, and only serves to lengthen the period of brand exclusivity,
making drug therapy more costly for Canadians. Justification for Canada’s current
protection of pharmaceutical patents through the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations needs to be elucidated and supported with data about the time
required for generic drug development and approval to provide Canada with a defensible
position for future international trade negotiations. Extending data exclusivity
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The text of the agreement was finalized on September 26, 2014 and is currently awaiting ratification.
The finalized text can be found at www.international.gc.ca/CETA.
304
Supra note 110. Also see Paul Grootendorst and Aidan Hollis, “The 2011 Canada-European Union
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: an economic impact assessment of the EU’s proposed
pharmaceutical intellectual property provisions,” (2011) 8(2), J Gen Meds, 81-103 at 93. The European
Union negotiated successfully to extend patent term by the amount of time equal to the difference between
the filing date for a Notice of Compliance and the date the Notice of Compliance is granted (patent term
restoration). This extended patent life by over two years, and if the data exclusivity provisions were
applied, the total time extension is estimated by Grootenorst and Hollis to be approximately five and a half
years.
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complicates patenting in Canada, as market exclusivity would become affected by two
separate levers that really serve the same purpose.
Equal Rights of Appeal
Article 9 bis of the Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic Trade
Agreement states that
If a Party relies on “patent linkage” mechanisms whereby the granting of
marketing authorisations (or notices of compliance or similar concepts) for
generic pharmaceutical products is linked to the existence of patent protection, it
shall ensure that all litigants are afforded equivalent and effective rights of
appeal.305
However, there have been no adjustments to the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations regarding an appeal process to date. Research needs to be
undertaken to determine if current provisions, with the lack of an effective appeal for the
patent holder, fulfill this provision. Consideration needs to be given to the full process
that is still available through the Patent Act, and provisions for damages that apply if the
patents are later upheld. An additional appeal functions as a patent extension, and
changing the Regulations to allow for an appeal will have costly consequences for the
court system, as well as for users of medicines in Canada.
Final Conclusions
Given the evidence in the pattern of decision making, it is difficult to conceive
that there is any merit to amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations to encompass a complete action for infringement. Suzanne Porter’s
conclusion that the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations need to be
amended to convert a generic patent challenge to a full action for infringement is not

305

Supra note 303 at 9, 10.
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supported by this study, in that there is no evidence that the process of judicial review at
the Federal Court is causing more disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices than
in the general Supreme Court jurisprudence. The assertion by the European Union that
innovative drugs are not given full protection under the Patent Act, because of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, is therefore not warranted, as
the current process essentially adds an additional layer of patent protection, and the
additional process is adjudicating the claims correctly. An action for infringement is still
available by the innovator under the Patent Act, even though the generic manufacturer is
free to start manufacturing and selling the generic. This is supports Canada’s position in
the complaint filed by the European Union in 2000, as well as the conclusions in the
Report of the Panel.306
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Supra note 5 at p 116.
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Appendix 1: NAFTA Article 1709
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, each Party shall make patents available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that such inventions are new, result from an inventive step and are capable of
application. For purposes of this Article, a Party may deem the terms "inventive
step" and "capable of industrial application" to be synonymous with the terms
"non-obvious" and "useful," respectively.
2. A Party may exclude from patentability inventions if preventing in its territory
the commercial exploitation of the inventions is necessary to protect order public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to nature or the environment, provided that the exclusion is not
based solely on the ground that the Party prohibits commercial exploitation in its
territory of the subject matter of the patent.
3. A Party may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals;
(b) plants and animals other than microorganisms; and
(c) essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other
than non-biological and microbiological processes for such production.
Notwithstanding subparagraph (b), each Party shall provide for the protection of
plant varieties through patents, an effective scheme of sui generis protection, or
both.
4. If a Party has not made available product patent protection for pharmaceutical
or agricultural chemicals commensurate with paragraph 1:
(a) as of January 1, 1992, for subject matter that relates to naturally occurring
substances prepared or produced by, or significantly derived from,
microbiological processes and intended for food or medicine, and
(b) as of July 1, 1991, for any other subject matter,
that Party shall provide to the inventor of any such product or its assignee the
means to obtain product patent protection for such product for the unexpired term
of the patent for such product granted in another Party, as long as the product has
not been marketed in the Party providing protection under this paragraph and the
person seeking such protection makes a timely request.
5. Each Party shall provide that:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, the patent shall confer on the
patent owner the right to prevent other persons from making, using or selling the
subject matter of the patent, without the patent owner's consent; and
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, the patent shall confer on the
patent owner the right to prevent other persons from using that process and from
using, selling, or importing at least the product obtained directly by that process,
without the patent owner's consent.
6. A Party may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
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interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of other
persons.
7. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, the territory of the
Party where the invention was made and whether products are imported or locally
produced.
8. A Party may revoke a patent only when:
(a) grounds exist that would have justified a refusal to grant the patent; or
(b) the grant of a compulsory license has not remedied the lack of exploitation of
the patent.
9. Each Party shall permit patent owners to assign and transfer by succession their
patents, and to conclude licensing contracts.
10. Where the law of a Party allows for use of the subject matter of a patent, other
than that use allowed under paragraph 6, without the authorization of the right
holder, including use by the government or other persons authorized by the
government, the Party shall respect the following provisions:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits;
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within
a reasonable period of time. The requirement to make such efforts may be waived
by a Party in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the public noncommercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will
be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly;
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it
was authorized;
(d) such use shall be non-exclusive;
(e) such use shall be non-assignable, except with that part of the enterprise or
goodwill that enjoys such use;
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the Party's
domestic market;
(g) authorization for such use shall be liable, subject to adequate protection of the
legitimate interests of the persons so authorized, to be terminated if and when the
circumstances that led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur. The competent
authority shall have the authority to review, on motivated request, the continued
existence of these circumstances;
(h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of
each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization;
(i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization shall be subject
to judicial or other independent review by a distinct higher authority;
(j) any decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall
be subject to judicial or other independent review by a distinct higher authority;
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(k) the Party shall not be obliged to apply the conditions set out in subparagraphs
(b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative process to be anticompetitive. The need to correct
anticompetitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of
remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to
refuse termination of authorization if and when the conditions that led to such
authorization are likely to recur;
(l) the Party shall not authorize the use of the subject matter of a patent to permit
the exploitation of another patent except as a remedy for an adjudicated violation
of domestic laws regarding anticompetitive practices.
11. Where the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, each
Party shall, in any infringement proceeding, place on the defendant the burden
of establishing that the allegedly infringing product was made by a process other
the patented process in one of the following situations:
(a) the product obtained by the patented process is new; or
(b) a substantial likelihood exists that the allegedly infringing product was made
by the process and the patent owner has been unable through reasonable efforts
to determine the process actually used.
In the gathering and evaluation of evidence, the legitimate interests of the
defendant in protecting its trade secrets shall be taken into account.
12. Each Party shall provide a term of protection for patents of at least 20 years
from the date of filing or 17 years from the date of grant. A Party may extend the
term of patent protection, in appropriate cases, to compensate for delays caused
by regulatory approval processes.307

307

Supra note 3, Ch 17, Art 1709.
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Appendix 4: Proceeding by way of Judicial Review versus an Action for Infringement
The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations could offer correct
determinations of patent validity if the summary proceeding was replaced with an
infringement action by an amendment to section 6 of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations. This change would be particularly relevant if other evidence
in this thesis supports the idea that judicial review provides an insufficient means of
assessing patent validity.
However, section 6(1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations states that a first person may “…apply to a court for an order…”311 which
insinuates that the litigation proceed by way of application. Sections 6(3) and 6(4) also
refer to an application, in support of litigation originating as an application, which
proceeds by way of summary.
Section 18.4(1) of the Federal Courts Act dictates that summary proceedings take
place in a short period of time: “…an application or reference to the Federal Court under
any of sections 18.1 to 18.3 shall be heard and determined without delay and in a
summary way.”312 This part of the act explains why Part 5 of the Federal Court
Regulations imposes strict time frames for the delivery of documents, pleas,
examinations, cross-examinations, and affidavits to the court, and to the parties for
summary proceedings. But section 18.4(2) of the Federal Courts Act can facilitate the
substitution of an action, and a subsequent complete trial, in place of a summary

311
312

Supra note 1, s 6(1).
Supra note 54, s 18.4(1).
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proceeding: “The Federal Court may, if it considers it appropriate, direct that an
application for judicial review be treated and proceeded with as an action.”313
The jurisprudence record demonstrates that the request for an Order of Prohibition
does not proceed as an action for infringement. In Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v
Canada,314 the Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that the sole purpose of litigation under
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations is to decide whether a Notice
of Compliance should issue as per the requirements laid out in the Food and Drug
Regulations, and not whether patents are being infringed. Therefore, formal decisions on
patent infringement must be adjudicated separately, applying the rules of the Patent
Act.315 However, it is interesting to note that Rouleau J. held previously in Bayer AG v
Canada316 that “although the Regulations contemplate proceeding by way of judicial
review, I am satisfied that it would be appropriate to direct that these applications
proceed by way of an action in accordance with subsection 18.4(2) of the Federal Court
Act.”317 This was in light of the fact that Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulation section 7(2)(b) refers to a declaration of the court, which had previously been
interpreted as a declaration made by way of judicial review.318 Rouleau stated that this
was not necessarily the case, since the effect of the Order of Prohibition was an
interlocutory injunction over an extended period of time,319 and that such an extended

313

Supra note 54, s 18.4(2).
[1994] FCJ 543, [1994] 55 CPR (3d) 1, at paras 5, 6.
315
This usually happens through the Federal Court system, but can be initiated in any provincial
jurisdiction.
316
Bayer AG et al v Minister of National Health and Welfare [1993] FCJ 752, [1993] 51 CPR (3d) 87.
317
Ibid at para 7.
318
Rouleau quotes Judge McGillis, the motions judge, as making this statement June 8 and 10, 1993, in
regards to a motion on the same case. Section 7(2)(b) deals with the declaration of the court as to the
validity of the patents in question.
319
The order of prohibition was thirty months at that time, but has since been reduced to twenty-four
months in an amendment in 1997.
314
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period of time meant that making the decision could not necessarily be done in an
expeditious fashion, and therefore not akin to a quick proceeding via judicial review. He
was therefore comfortable in ordering this case as an action.
However, in Huntley v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),320
Pinard J. held that proceeding by way of action through section 18.4(2), the court “must
find procedural or remedial inadequacies with the process of the underlying
application.”321 In explaining the limited circumstances where an action is to be
substituted for judicial review, Pinard J. summarized:
It is, in general, only where facts of whatever nature cannot be satisfactorily
established or weighed through affidavit evidence that consideration should be
given to using subsection 18.4(2) of the Act. One should not lose sight of the clear
intention of Parliament to have applications for judicial review determined
whenever possible with as much speed and as little encumbrances and delays of
the kind associated with trials as are possible. The "clearest of circumstances", to
use the words of Muldoon J., where that subsection may be used, is where there is
a need for viva voce evidence, either to assess demeanour and credibility of
witnesses or to allow the Court to have a full grasp of the whole of the evidence
whenever it feels the case cries out for the full panoply of a trial. [...]322
The jurisprudence made by Pinard J. explains why proceedings arising out of the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations have been adjudicated via
judicial review from the beginning. Substituting judicial review for an action is reserved
for specific cases where the credibility of witnesses is an issue, who need to be observed
during cross-examination.323 Moving to a full trial process could achieve correctness
with respect to patenting, and would allow witnesses to be examined and cross-examined

320

[2010] FCJ 497.
Ibid at para 7.
322
Huntley v Canada [2010] FCJ 497, [2010] FC 407.
323
Viva voce evidence refers to evidence that is adduced in person, where the observation of the witness is
deemed to be important in determining the credibility of the witness.
321
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in person.324, 325 However, adjudicating generic approval disputes through a full trial as
opposed to judicial review is only relevant if it is determined that the process of judicial
review is inhibiting the proper evaluation of patent status.

324

Whether or not the credibility of expert witnesses is issue (or how much of an issue it is) with the current
regulations, it is interesting to consider that the credibility of expert witnesses may need to be treated more
seriously, and further research could reveal more about the nature of such testimony from scientific experts
who are paid to pick a side and submit evidence.
325
The focus for allowing for the substitution of an action, however, could have been on different
“procedural or remedial inadequacies,” to demonstrate that deciding to include certain patents on the
register was not reasonable, and that such an issue requires correctly determining the validity of patents.
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Appendix Five: The Copyright Cases
Case

Issue

Decision

Standard of
Review
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Composers, Authors and
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2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 SCR 339 [CCH].
327

142
Society of Composers,
Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v
Canadian Association of
Internet Providers [SOCAN
v CAIP]333
Robertson v Thomson Corp
[Robertson]334

Euro-Excellence Inc. v
Kraft Canada Inc.
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Crookes v Newton
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335
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2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269 [Crookes].
334

Majority with
concurring
reasons

Majority (4) (two
majority
decisions) with
unanimous
minority dissent
(not solo)

Majority with
concurring
reasons (2 sets)
and minority
dissent (not solo)
Majority with
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